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INTRODUCTION
American legal scholars, after examining our separation of powers
jurisprudence, have deemed it a mess. 1 They point to the Supreme Court's
modem cases, which tend to oscillate between two incompatible doctrinal
approaches without explaining why one is chosen.2 The "formalist" cases
stress the undoubted purpose of the Constitution's Framers to create three
separate and distinct branches of government. 3 Formalism is a process of
* Harold H. Bruff is the Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law at the University
of Colorado.
1. See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, Why Our Separation of Powers Jurisprudence Is So
Abysmal, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 506 (1989).
2. See generally Symposium, Reviving the Structural Constitution, 22 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 3 (1998); Harold H. Bruff, On the Constitutional Status of the Administrative
Agencies, 36 Am. U. L. REV. 491 (1987); M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in
Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1127 (2000); Thomas W. Merrill, The
Constitutional Principle of Separation of Powers, 1991 SuP. CT. REV. 225; Peter L. Strauss,
The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984); Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to
Separation-of-Powers Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488 (1987).
3. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 301 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(stating that "[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the
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reasoning logically, and often narrowly, from the text of the Constitution
and the emphasis on the need for three autonomous branches. One goal is
to draw clear lines of authority. Other cases are "functionalist," stressing
the Framers' equally apparent purpose to allow some blending of power.4
Functionalism responds to the modem-day perception of a need to allow
for diverse government structure, especially below the level of the three
constitutional branches themselves. Functionalists stress the blending of
powers in the Constitution and the Framers' arguments for checks and
balances. They ask such questions as whether a particular institutional
arrangement aggrandizes the power of a branch or invades the "core
functions" of another branch-if not, they would uphold it.
Apart from the Court's doctrinal inconsistency, there are defects in each
of its favored approaches. Formalism is very fierce; it consumes statutes
that may serve real needs of government. Functionalism is quite
permissive; it blesses statutes that may contain serious flaws. The way out
of this mess, I believe, is for the Court to identify principles establishing
when it should take a strict approach to statutes, and when it should not.
That task, once completed, can lead to a judgment that our separation of
powers jurisprudence is not a "mess" after all-it is merely complicated
and, like all law, imperfect in some particulars.
The Framers of the Constitution had three broad purposes in mind as
they constructed a scheme of partly separated powers. First, they hoped to
ensure the rule of law as a government "of laws not men."5 Second,
because oppression can result from duly enacted laws as well as from
despots, they searched for means to preserve their newly-won liberties.
Third, they hoped to create a republic that would be marked by public
virtue and promotion of the public, not private, interest. 6 The complex and
original means that the Framers chose to achieve these purposes was a
government featuring three branches that were partly autonomous but also
partly accountable to each other. The Framers hoped that the effect of this
unique structure would be a balanced government. Indeed, they wanted
this form of government to reflect the traditional "mixture" theories they
had endorsed as the way to avoid tyrannical power concentrations.7
same hands,... may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny").
4. See id. at 302 ("[Montesquieu] did not mean that these departments ought to have
no partial agency in, or no control over, the acts of each other.").
5. See M.N.S. SELLERS, AMERICAN REPUBLICANISM, ROMAN IDEOLOGY IN THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION 69-70 (1994) (attributing the phrase to Livy). In England, it was
taken up again by James Harrington in The Commonwealth of Oceana (1656).
See POLITICAL WORKS OF JAMES HARRINGTON (J.G.A. Pocock ed., 1977).
6. GARRY WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA (1981).
7. See, e.g., I. BERNARD COHEN, SCIENCE AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS 215-17 (1995)
(explaining that among the Framers, John Adams, drawing on arguments for balanced
government from the works of Machiavelli and Harrington's Oceana, placed special
emphasis on balance). Traditional mixture theories, dating from Polybius, used a balance of
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American courts, and especially the Supreme Court, have translated
these general purposes and structural characteristics into a body of law
concerning separation of powers. After more than two centuries of case
law, the resultant doctrines fall into four broad categories, each of which
can be tied to the original purposes of the separation of powers doctrine.
First, some leading cases promote the rule of law by forcing the executive
to obey statutes and Congress to obey the Constitution.8 This is not,
however, an uncomplicated task. The rule of law must always accord an
appropriate place for discretion; judgments about the appropriate tradeoffs
between the two values are inevitable. 9  Second, other leading cases
balance the need for the autonomy of each branch against the equally
evident need that it be accountable to the other branches and to the people
in essential ways. 10 The question here is what particular kinds of autonomy
and accountability should be recognized. Third, the courts engage in a
general review of legislation to detect any aggrandizement of power or
disturbance of the overall balance that might have escaped the other two
inquiries." Not surprisingly, this rather unanchored third test is often
assailed for its subjectivity.
To review the jurisprudence that has been generated by these first three
inquiries is a separate subject.1 2 In this Article, I isolate a fourth portion of
the Supreme Court's doctrine and suggest a principle by which it can be
understood, guided, and critiqued. The focus of this body of law is the
need to maintain the essential structure of the Constitution while allowing
construction of a complex modern government. I begin, as the Framers
did, with a foundational choice about the structure of the national
government: that it would be a system of separated powers instead of the
blending that characterizes parliamentary government.1 3 My thesis is that
the Court should enforce the formal separations between Congress and the
executive that establish the boundaries between these two branches, and
the elements of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy to prevent the dominance of any one
of them. The American republic, lacking monarchs and nobles, had to balance government
branches to achieve a similar effect.
8. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
9. A major role of modem administrative law, especially after the expansion of
standing in the second half of the twentieth century, is to allow citizens and organizations to
serve as a check on the government's compliance with statutes.
10. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 684 (1974).
11. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
12. 1 have explored the subject in HAROLD H. BRUFF, BALANCE OF FORCES: SEPARATION
OF POWERS LAW IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (2006).
13. The Framers' equally foundational choice of federalism is not pertinent to my
discussion, as it involves the relationship of the national government to the states. For a
ringing endorsement of the parliamentary form for nations contemplating new governments,
see Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633 (2000).
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that most other relationships among the branches be left to Congress to
adjust by statute. To understand why, it is necessary to begin at the
beginning.
In his famous discussion of the separation of powers in The Federalist,
James Madison asked: "Will it be sufficient to mark, with precision, the
boundaries of these [three] departments, in the constitution of the
government, and to trust to these parchment barriers against the
encroaching spirit of power?"'14 Experience had taught that the answer was
"no." Instead, "the great security against a gradual concentration of the
several powers in the same department consists in giving to those who
administer each department the necessary constitutional means and
personal motives to resist encroachments of the others .... Ambition must
be made to counteract ambition." 15 A primary mechanism to achieve these
goals was the Incompatibility Clause in Article I, § 6, providing that "no
Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of
either House during his Continuance in Office." The Clause assures that
different persons will write and execute the laws, creating the means and
motives that keep the branches separate.
The Incompatibility Clause has never been interpreted by the Supreme
Court. That does not trivialize the Clause, however. Our system of
government rests on textual provisions of the Constitution that have never
been litigated because their clarity has forestalled controversies that the
Framers intended to prevent.' 6 The Incompatibility Clause ought to be
much more important to judicial interpretation of our system of separated
and checked powers than its history of neglect by the courts suggests.
Most of the Supreme Court's formalist cases can be explained and justified
by reference to the policies that underlie the Clause. I call these policies
the incompatibility principle to distinguish them from the narrower textual
force of the Clause itself. The principle has lain just below the surface
even where the Court has chosen to rely on other, related constitutional
provisions such as the Appointments Clause. 7 The primary effect of the
14. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 308 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
15. Id. at 322.
16. For example, Article I assures Congress the right to meet every year, as well as the
right to control who sits as a member. These provisions responded to abuses that had
occurred in seventeenth century England, when a king prorogued Parliament for eleven
years and Cromwell's generals sat at the door of Parliament, determining who could enter.
See generally CHRISTOPHER HILL, THE CENTURY OF REVOLUTION, 1603-1714 (1961).
Hence, fundamental guarantees of the autonomy of Congress lie partly in constitutional
commands that have (happily) laid beyond controversy.
17. The Court's tendency to rely on constitutional text that it has frequently interpreted,
to the exclusion of more obscure, but perhaps more relevant provisions, is well known.
See, e.g., CHARLES A. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY 165 (1969)
("But to a Court which depends on a document for its authority, it is not clear that the
structural simplicity achieved by having a few clauses dominate constitutional adjudication
[59:2
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principle on constitutional adjudication should be to require strict
separations between legislative and executive personnel and functions.'
8
Thus, the Court's use of a permissive balancing, or "functional," approach
to approve blended powers in contexts not involving the legislative-
executive boundary can be explained and justified by the limits of the
incompatibility principle.
The Incompatibility Clause has prevented the development of a semi-
parliamentary form of government in the United States, in which many or
all members of the president's cabinet might sit simultaneously in
Congress. 19 The election of the president by the people, as refracted
through the electoral college, precludes any full parliamentary system. The
autonomy of each of the two political branches has persisted through all the
stresses and strains of our history. Even though, at the nadir of presidential
power in the late nineteenth century, Woodrow Wilson could describe our
system as "Congressional Government," the subsequent revival of an
independent and forceful executive needed only the firm hands of
Theodore Roosevelt on the reins of the presidency. a
This Madisonian tension and competition between the branches depends
on two kinds of separations between them. First, there are formal
relationships. The executive branch selects its officers, promotes them,
dismisses them, and assigns them to particular activities, all within the
parameters allowed by law. Congress does the same for its own agents.
Control follows these basic features of employment, and would be vitiated
or lost if some or all were absent. Second, the informal aspects of
separation, although dependent on the formal aspects, are no less important.
The two branches have their own distinct cultures, which they transmit to
is preferable to the directness with which decisions could be explained from the
constitutional text if more clauses were permitted to play a role.").
18. See infra notes 81-91 and accompanying text (discussing, in connection with INS
v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), that the principle could also call for separating legislative and
judicial functions).
19. Steven G. Calabresi & Joan L. Larsen, One Person, One Office: Separation of
Powers or Separation of Personnel?, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1045 (1994) (discussing the
background and effect of the Incompatibility Clause, and arguing for the extension of its
principle to joint executive-judicial and federal-state office holding).
20. See WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT: A STUDY IN AMERICAN
POLrICS 6 (1885) ("The noble charter of fundamental law given us by the Convention of 1787
is still our Constitution; but it is now our form of government rather in name than in reality, the
form of the Constitution being one of nicely adjusted, ideal balances, whilst the actual form of
our present government is simply a scheme of congressional supremacy."). By 1900, Wilson
perceived change: The president was once again "at the front of affairs." See WOODROW
WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT: A STUDY IN AMERICAN POLITICS 22 (15th ed. 1900)
("He [the president] may be both the leader of his party and the leader of the nation, or he may
be one or the other."). "If he lead the nation, his party can hardly resist him. His office is
anything he has the sagacity and force to make it." Id. When he reached the presidency, Wilson
certainly tried to play this role, and often succeeded. See AUGUST HECKSCHER, WOODROW
WILSON (1991).
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new employees through training, peer pressure, and daily exposure to the
arguments favoring their own branch. Officers of the political branches
soon form loyalties to and share the values of their own branch; they
readily believe that their branch is right and the other is wrong about the
enduring issues. All lawyers experience this kind of effect when they
participate in adversary procedures. Indeed, many workers in all fields
generate loyalty to their employers-mat least if the company treats them
decently.
Members of Congress and their staffs see Congress as the "first branch,"
tied closely to the people and exercising the primal function of legislation.21
From Capitol Hill, the executive branch appears arrogant and secretive,
dangerous in its capacity for sudden action, and strangely unresponsive to
the people's will as embodied in Congress. In contrast, the president and
his cabinet see themselves as representing the nation in a way that local
politicians in Congress cannot, and they certainly consider themselves
sufficiently open to outside influences from many quarters, including
Congress and the general public. From the White House and its environs,
Congress appears meddlesome, suspicious, and fractured. Both of the
branches tend to descend into self-righteousness when relating to each
other. This characteristic confirms the Madisonian tension, but at the cost
of impeding working relationships.
Lawyers for a branch of government are immersed in a longstanding
legal tradition of shared views about their branch's powers and perquisites.
The body of precedents that their predecessors have generated is known to
them, and is self-perpetuating because no one wants to waive or undermine
traditional institutional arguments. In addition, career advancement within
the branch is more likely for those who strongly champion its interests.
Finally, there is never an absence of competing views from the other
branch and private parties, which to the government lawyer seem to be
skewed by interest and clearly erroneous on the merits. These competing
arguments create compensatory aggressiveness in interpretation and
argument. On the other hand, opposing views may check irresponsible
arguments by exposing their flaws.
The effectiveness of the combination of formal and informal means of
control is especially clear when a long-time member of one branch moves
22to the other. For example, when Senator John Ashcroft became Attorney
General Ashcroft, no one should have expected him to remain a
21. See, e.g., ABNER J. MIKVA & PATTI B. SARIS, THE AMERICAN CONGRESS, THE FIRST
BRANCH (1983).
22. For example, Abner J. Mikva served as a member of Congress, U.S. Circuit Judge,
and White House Counsel, a separation of powers trifecta. He seems to have adjusted his
loyalties appropriately with each new post.
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congressional loyalist, nor did he. The most that should have been
expected is sympathetic understanding of the interests of the branch
formerly occupied. The Framers understood the mutability of loyalty, as
they demonstrated by their prohibition of joint but not sequential office
holding in the two branches.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
The original purpose of the Incompatibility Clause was to protect, rather
23than to confine, legislative power. The Framers, who kept a close eye on
British political developments, followed a longstanding controversy over
"corruption. ' '24 The term had several meanings in that era, centering on the
use of public office to produce private gain over public virtue. After
restoration of the monarchy in the seventeenth century, English kings
searched for ways to control the surging power of Parliament. They began
"corrupting" Parliament by offering its members lucrative executive
positions, in hopes of securing influence over them in their legislative
capacity. 25 The Framers learned about government in Great Britain largely
through the writings of the opposition, the "outs," who were fearful of
placemen and of Parliament's habit of expanding government by making
23. See Calabresi & Larsen, supra note 19, at 1052-77.
24. GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 80-81, 174-75
(1992); see also Margaret A. Banks, Drafting the American Constitution-Attitudes in the
Philadelphia Convention Towards the British System of Government, 10 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
15,31 (1966).
25. See J.H. PLUMB, ENGLAND IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 47 (1950) (noting that in
the early eighteenth century, "the relationship between executive and legislature bewildered
contemporary Englishmen"). He explains:
Bolingbroke, the chief expositor of constitutional theory in the early decades, felt
that the executive had no right to be in Parliament which was to be the judge of its
acts, but the practical wisdom of Walpole and Newcastle saw that, if any continuity
of policy was to be achieved, the executive needed to be in control .... Nor was
there any party organization as we know it. Hence, left to its own devices,
Parliament would have been an anarchy of individual minds and wills, swayed by
the tide of circumstance.
Id. The solution, Plumb explains, was to give the King's supporters places, "usually
sinecures, such as Me-qter of the King's Tennis Court or Taster of the King's Wines in
Dublin," in return for which they voted as desired and helped "in piloting government
measures through the Commons." Id. at 47-48; see also W.S. Holdsworth, The Conventions
of the Eighteenth-Century Constitution, 17 IOWA L. REv. 161, 163-70 (1932) (discussing
influence as a link between the Crown and Parliament). In the eighteenth century, the
Cabinet was a loose link; Parliament could oust a minister or demand an appointment, but
defeat of a program would not cause resignation of the group. Cabinet government and
collective ministerial responsibility had not yet developed, and emerged only well into the
nineteenth century. In the eighteenth century, the Crown used patronage which checked
Parliament and kept it from dominating completely.
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new places to fill. 26 Hence, to our founding generation, joint office holding
threatened to afford the executive undue influence over the legislature.27
The subsequent history of Great Britain demonstrated that "corruption"
works both ways. Joint office holding soon became the mechanism by
which Parliament worked its will with the executive. This point about the
potential effects of blended functions is fundamental to the incompatibility
principle. Drawing a bright line between our own legislative and executive
branches assures the autonomy of each from the other. The temporary
political ascendancy of one branch cannot be converted into a permanent
institutional one, as has occurred in Britain.
In America, both the post-revolutionary state governments and the
Articles of Confederation banned joint office holding. 28  Without
controversy, the Constitutional Convention adopted the Incompatibility
Clause to prevent it. There was, however, spirited controversy over the
companion Ineligibility Clause which, as eventually adopted, provides that
"[n]o Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was
26. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
(1967) (noting that English opposition thought was "devoured by the colonists," and was
very familiar to them throughout the eighteenth century). He further states that this was the
set of beliefs "from which would issue the specific arguments of the American Revolution."
Id. at 44. Key elements were natural rights, the contract basis of society, and the value of
the mixed constitution of England. Opposition writers of both left and right "viewed their
circumstances with alarm, ... and dwelt endlessly on the evidences of corruption they saw
about them and the dark future these malignant signs portended." Id. at 46. They saw
political stability under Walpole as based "on the systematic corruption of Parliament by the
executive, which, they warned, if left unchecked, would eat away the foundations of
liberty." Id. at 48. They "hammered away" at this "obsessive concern" and found a
receptive audience in the colonies, where their heated descriptions were received as fact. Id.
27. There was a related concern among the colonists about multiple office holding in
general, regardless of whether it produced a technical incompatibility. The poster child for
this concern was Thomas Hutchinson of Massachusetts, who held numerous royal offices
simultaneously. See FRED ANDERSON, CRUCIBLE OF WAR 605-06, 669 (2000).
28. See Calabresi & Larsen, supra note 19, at 1056-58 (explaining that in the Colonies,
Royal Governors used patronage to buy support for the Crown, and that eleven of thirteen
state constitutions had strict incompatibility clauses, with New York and South Carolina
being the exceptions); see also GORDON S. WOOD, THE AMERICANIZATION OF BENJAMIN
FRANKLIN 164 (2004) (reporting Franklin's republican purity in urging the state
constitution's drafters in Pennsylvania to adopt an article that "expressed a view of
government that his witnessing corrupt English politicians seeking lucrative royal offices
had taught him"). As enacted, it condemned "'offices of profit, the usual effects of which
are dependence and servility unbecoming freemen, in the possessors and expectants; faction,
contention, corruption, and disorder among the people."' WOOD, supra, at 164. Wood
concludes that "Americans in 1776 thought that the Crown had used money and influence to
buy up the House of Commons and had corrupted the English constitution. They meant to
prevent that corruption in their own new republican state constitutions." Id. at 165. Article
V of the Articles of Confederation accordingly forbade every delegate to Congress to hold
"any office under the United States, for which he, or another for his benefit, receives any salary,
fees or emolument of any kind." ART. OF CONFEDERATION art. V.
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elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United
States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall
have been increased during such time. 29
The Virginia Plan, with which the Constitutional Convention began,
rendered members of Congress ineligible for "any office ... under the
authority of the United States ... during the term of service," and for an
unspecified time thereafter. 30 Thus, joint office holding would be barred,
and sequential office holding limited. Debate, which focused on the
sequential barrier, harkened back to the British experience. The
Convention's most ardent republicans, Gerry and Mason, stressed the
proven dangers of executive corruption and thought a strong ineligibility
provision was essential to protecting the people's liberty. 3' Hamilton,
invoking Hume, responded that the executive needed some means of
influence to preserve the overall balance among the branches. 32 Wilson
cautioned that a rigid ineligibility rule could deprive the nation of its best
military leaders in wartime if they happened to be serving in Congress-
and everyone knew he was referring to Washington. Madison opposed
ineligibility because he thought the prospect of subsequent executive office
would attract more able candidates for Congress. He crafted a
characteristically elegant compromise by proposing the clause as it was
eventually adopted. He thought that congressional nest-feathering, and not
29. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 6, cl. 2. See Calabresi & Larsen, supra note 19, at 1062-77
(charting the constitutional history of the Incompatibility and Ineligibility Clauses); see also
THORNTON ANDERSON, CREATING THE CONSTrTUION, THE CONVENTION OF 1787 AND THE FIRST
CONGRESS 143-48 (1993); 2 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 346-73 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph
Lemer eds., 1987) (offering a selection of original sources bearing on the Clauses).
30. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 20-21 (Max Farrand ed., rev.
ed. 1987) (May 29, 1987) [hereinafter FARRAND].
31. See WOOD, supra note 28, at 216-17 (demonstrating how Benjamin Franklin
exemplified republican purity by his proposal that members of the executive in the new
nation serve without pay). Franklin
had long believed that there were 'two Passions which have a powerful
Influence in the Affairs of Men... Ambition and Avarice; the Love of Power
and the Love of Money.' Each separately was a forceful spur to action, but
when united in the minds of some men they had the most violent effects ....
Franklin's evidence for his views was England. For many years he had
believed.., that 'the Root of the Evil' in England's politics lay 'in the
enormous Salaries, Emoluments, and Patronage' of its 'Great Offices.'
Id. The American counter-example, of course, was Washington, who had served as
Commander in Chief for eight years without pay. Franklin's "classically republican"
motion was seconded, tabled, and forgotten. "'It was treated with great respect,' Madison
noted, 'but rather for the author of it than from any conviction of its expediency or
practicability."' Id.
32. See FARRAND, supra note 30, at 381 ("We have been taught to reprobate the danger
of influence in the British government, without duly reflecting how far it was necessary to
support a good government.") (quoting Alexander Hamilton).
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ordinary ambition, was the abuse to be remedied.33 It was only late in the
Convention, however, that disagreements over ineligibility were resolved
and Madison's compromise adopted.34
The Incompatibility and Ineligibility Clauses were linked closely to the
Appointments Clause in the minds of the Framers. 35 The joint operation of
these three provisions would promote the delicate balance of power that
suffuses the Constitution. Congress could create or enhance offices but
could neither fill them itself nor press for nomination of its members to
new offices.3 6 The president, holding an important patronage power, could
33. See id. at 386, 388 (calling his position a "middle ground," Madison "supposed that
the unnecessary creation of offices, and increase of salaries, were the evils most
experienced .... "). If "the door was shut" against them "it might properly be left open" for
other appointments as an inducement to "the Legislative service." Id. at 386. This raises the
possibility that the Ineligibility Clause can be satisfied (or evaded) by depriving an appointee of
the increase in emoluments that occurred during his or her congressional service. See Michael
Stokes Paulsen, Is Lloyd Bentsen Unconstitutional?, 46 STAN. L. REv. 907 (1994) (providing an
account of the recurrent controversy about this issue and a strict view of the Clause).
34. See FARRAND, supra note 30, at 166 (showing how The Committee of Detail Report
still had a bar on joint offices during congressional terms, and another year for senators).
On August 14, 1787, that provision was considered. Id. at 283-90. Pinkney, arguing that
the bar was a waste of talent and a disincentive to serve, moved to replace it with an
ineligibility clause such as the one earlier proposed by Madison. Mason thought this would
encourage a "mercenary and depraved ambition." Mercer argued the executive's need for
influence by the power to offer appointments. Gouvemeur Morris urged a simple
incompatibility clause: "Why should we not avail ourselves of their services if the people
chuse to give them their confidence." The issue was postponed until the Committee of
Eleven reported, providing for ineligibility during the term of congressional office, along
with a simple incompatibility clause. Id. at 483. On September 3, 1787, it was taken up and
amended into essentially its final form. Id. at 492.
35. See THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at 459 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(closing his discussion of the president and the appointment power, and noting that the check of
senatorial confirmation was not the Constitution's "only reliance" for controlling the president's
appointments). The Incompatibility and Ineligibility Clauses "provided some important guards
against the danger of executive influence upon the legislative body." Id. Madison called the
Ineligibility Clause a way to prevent the president from suborning the "virtue" of the House.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 55, at 346 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also
H. Lee Watson, Congress Steps Out: A Look at Congressional Control of the Executive, 63
CAL. L. REv. 983, 1037-43 (1975).
36. See Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 483-84 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (refusing to countenance statutory restrictions on the President's process for
selecting judicial nominees). Kennedy thought the role of Congress under the Appointments
Clause was closely limited.
By its terms, the Clause divides the appointment power into two separate spheres:
the President's power to "nominate," and the Senate's power to give or withhold its
"Advice and Consent." No role whatsoever is given either to the Senate or to
Congress as a whole in the process of choosing the person who will be nominated
for appointment.
Id. at 483. Kennedy buttressed his viewpoint by invoking the words of Alexander Hamilton:
In the act of nomination, [the President's] judgment alone would be exercised; and
as it would be his sole duty to point out the man who, with the approbation of the
Senate, should fill an office, his responsibility would be as complete as if he were
to make the final appointment.
Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at 456-57 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961)) (emphasis added).
It will be the office of the President to nominate, and, with the advice and consent
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fill offices with the Senate's consent, but could neither create them nor
offer them to someone who would also remain in Congress.3 7 Hence, the
functions of generating and applying the laws would be placed in separate
hands, reducing the potential for arbitrary treatment of citizens.
The fear of corruption remained evident in the early Republic, the period
of the Framers-in-government. Jefferson's visceral opposition to
Hamilton's financial program at the new Treasury Department grew out of
his understanding of British history: Walpole had built his own power by
expanding the Treasury and linking it to both the Commons and
commercial interests. 39 There were even concerns regarding a proposal to
have Hamilton report his recommendations on raising revenue to Congress
out of a fear of undue executive influence.40  In these early days, the
Washington Administration's practice of appointing members of Congress
to the European ministries raised old fears of executive patronage, even
though they resigned to take the offices. The fact that appointments were
being made only from the President's party seemed corrupt as well. 4' The
new Constitution contained no bar against joint judicial-executive service,
probably because the judiciary was only beginning to be separated clearly
from its executive roots in England.4 2 Yet, republican purists objected to
of the Senate, to appoint. There will, of course, be no exertion of choice on the
part of the Senate. They may defeat one choice of the Executive, and oblige him to
make another; but they cannot themselves choose-they can only ratify or reject
the choice he may have made.
Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 66, at 405 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961)). "Indeed, the sole limitation on the President's power to nominate these officials is found
in the Incompatibility Clause . I... d. at 484.
37. See THE FEDERALIST No. 69 (Alexander Hamilton) (defending the presidency as less
powerful and dangerous than the British monarchy on a number of grounds, including the
monarch's ability both to create and fill offices, whereas the president was only allowed to
nominate to existing offices, with the Senate checking him in that function).
38. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (offering the
classic statement of this purpose of separation of powers).
39. See BERNARD BAILYN, To BEGIN THE WORLD ANEW: THE GENIUS AND AMBIGUITIES
OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDERS 49-50 (2003). Jefferson
understood the threatening implications immediately; they squared perfectly
with his historical memory and his political beliefs and fears. He, like radical
theorists in Britain, believed it had all happened before, early in the century, in
Walpole's buildup of the power of the British Treasury in collaboration with
[banking and commercial interests.) That alliance, he knew, had allowed
Walpole to buy the votes he needed in the House of Commons, overthrow the
famed separation of powers of the government, and usher in an age of limitless
greed and political squalor."
Id. The engine of corruption was to be the Bank of the United States. "The bank's
stockholders, like those of the Bank of England, would forever be able to manufacture a
legislative majority to suit them and so corrupt the Constitution and reshape it 'on the model
of England .... Hamilton truly believed, Jefferson wrote, 'that corruption was essential to
the government of a nation."' Id.
40. JOSEPH M. LYNCH, NEGOTIATING THE CONSTITUTION: THE EARLIEST DEBATES OVER
ORIGINAL INTENT 104 (1999).
41. Id. at 172-73.
42. See Case of Hayburn, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 413 (1792) (holding that no court could
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the appointment of the first two Chief Justices, Jay and Ellsworth, to be
ambassadors while continuing to serve on the Court.43
Throughout American history, the Incompatibility Clause has been
mostly self-enforcing. No one thinks that he or she can hold another major
federal office while in Congress. Thus, at the outbreak of the Civil War,
several members of Congress resigned to join the Army, hoping, no doubt,
soon to return triumphant.4 4 In addition, "the President's duty to take care
that the law of the Incompatibility Clause is observed requires him or her to
ensure that appointments and legislation creating governmental positions
are consistent with the Clause., 45  The Department of Justice does not
object to the service of members of Congress in other offices that are
"advisory or ceremonial," such as the Commission on the Bicentennial of
the Constitution.46 For more substantial posts, the Department can treat
acceptance of a seat in Congress as an implied resignation of the executive
office.47 Nevertheless, political delicacies can forestall strict enforcement
of the Clause, as can be seen in the Supreme Court's only flirtation with the
merits of an incompatibility controversy.48
II. INCOMPATIBILITY AND STANDING TO SUE
In Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War,4 9 and its
companion case, United States v. Richardson,50 the Court declined to reach
the merits of separation of powers cases on grounds that the plaintiffs
lacked standing. Schlesinger involved a claim that the Incompatibility
perform an executive task reviewable by the Secretary of War, but several Justices thought
that individual judges could perform such service).
43. LYNCH, supra note 40, at 137, 211. See generally WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE
SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIPS OF JOHN JAY AND OLIVER
ELLSWORTH (1995).
44. Those members who resigned to join the Confederate Army encountered an
incompatibility of truly unique proportions.
45. Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger, Office of Legal
Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Justice, on The Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the
President and Congress, reprinted in H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
ATTORNEYS GENERAL 653 (1999).
46. Id.; see also Appointments to the Commission on the Bicentennial of the
Constitution, 8 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 200 (1984) (providing advice about compliance with
the Clause).
47. See, e.g., Case of the Collectorship of New Orleans, 12 Op. Att'y Gen. 449 (1868).
48. See Memorandum Opinion for the Counsel to the President, Members of Congress
Holding Reserve Commissions, 1 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 242, 244 n.1 1(1977) ("In 40 Op.
Atty. Gen. 301 (1943), Attorney General Biddle advised President Roosevelt that the power
to enforce Art. I, § 6, Cl. 2, rested with Congress and that the House of Representatives had
in the past disqualified Members who accepted military commissions for active service. He
concluded that it would be a 'sound and reasonable policy' for the President to avoid any
possible conflict with the clause by not permitting Members of Congress to serve on active
duty. We do not know what action, if any, the President took in response to the opinion.").
49. 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
50. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
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Clause forbade members of Congress to hold commissions in the Armed
Forces Reserve. The plaintiffs, an antiwar group, had sought mandamus
against the Secretary of Defense to force him to remove members of
Congress from the reserve lists. They alleged injury as war opponents,
citizens, and taxpayers, caused by undue executive influence over Reserve
officers who were also members of Congress.
The posture of the case reveals an immediate difficulty with judicial
enforcement of the clause. Its text-forbidding those holding offices to be
members of Congress-appears to be addressed to Congress, yet the
plaintiffs sued the military for relief. The reason is obvious: They were
trying to avoid the Speech or Debate privilege that protects members of
Congress from certain kinds of lawsuits. 51 To be sure, the Court has
allowed suit directly against members of Congress in contexts not within
the privilege.52 Even by steering well clear of that reef, however, the
plaintiffs could not hide the lurking presence of congressional autonomy
interests that the executive, for its part, had not been willing to confront.53
The Court would not confront them either.
Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the Court characterized the plaintiffs'
claim as involving "only the generalized interest of all citizens in
constitutional governance, and that is an abstract injury. 54 Of course, the
plaintiffs had tried to articulate an interest not shared with the public, and
had plausibly done so. Hence, Justice Marshall's dissent would have
grounded standing on the plaintiffs' antiwar stance, which they did not
share with everyone. They had, according to Marshall, "alleged a right,
under the Incompatibility Clause, to have their arguments considered by
Congressmen not subject to a conflict of interest by virtue of their positions
in the Armed Forces Reserves. 55  Nevertheless, the majority
mischaracterized their claim as a generalized grievance in a way that it
often does in standing cases. 56 Gliding on, the Court said that a concrete
injury was necessary to give the courts a factual context that would aid
51. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6 (stating "for any speech or debate in either house, they
shall not be questioned in any other place").
52. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979) (allowing a defamation
action for a press release).
53. After Schlesinger was decided, a Member of Congress wrote the President asking
that he enforce the Clause against reservists in Congress. The Department of Justice opined
that "the exclusive responsibility for interpreting and enforcing the Incompatibility Clause
rests with Congress." See Memorandum Opinion for the Counsel to the President, supra
note 49, at 242. The opinion distinguished the president's usual refusal to make
appointments contravening the Clause from this situation, in which the contested
appointments had already occurred.
54. Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 217.
55. Id. at 239 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan, also dissenting, would have
upheld taxpayer standing. Id. at 235-38 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
56. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
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sound judgment by revealing the consequences of a controversy.
Moreover, judicial restraint minimized conflict between the branches-in
this case, the Court feared potential conflict with both other branches. The
Court concluded that "[t]he proposition that all constitutional provisions are
enforceable by any citizen simply because citizens are the ultimate
beneficiaries of those provisions has no boundaries., 57 If the consequence
was that no one had standing, the issue would be remitted to the political
process.
Justice Douglas's dissent reached the merits. He argued that, as
Hamilton had pointed out, "the Incompatibility Clause had a specific
purpose: to avoid 'the danger of executive influence upon the legislative
body.' ' 58 Accordingly, the Framers "set up constitutional fences barring
certain affiliations., 59 This was to protect the interests of citizens, whose
"'personal stake' in the present case is keeping the Incompatibility Clause
an operative force in the Government by freeing the entanglement of the
federal bureaucracy with the Legislative Branch.,
60
The companion case, Richardson, involved a taxpayer's attempt to
compel publication of the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) budget. He
invoked the Constitution's requirement in Article I, § 9, that a "regular
Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public
Money shall be published from time to time., 61 The CIA Act authorized
secrecy for the agency's accounts.62 In another opinion by Chief Justice
Burger, the Court denied Richardson standing to sue. The Court declined
to extend Flast v. Cohen,63 which allowed taxpayers to challenge federal
spending, beyond the Establishment Clause context in which it arose. The
Court argued that because Richardson was not directly challenging an
exercise of the taxing or spending power, but rather the statutes regulating
the CIA, there was no "logical nexus" between his status as a taxpayer and
Congress's failure to require the executive to supply a more detailed report
of CIA expenditures. Although Richardson wanted more detailed
57. Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 227.
58. Id. at 232.
59. Id. at 233.
60. Id. at 234. He continued,
The interest of the citizen in this constitutional question is, of course, common to
all citizens. But as we said in United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687-688
[(1973)], "standing is not to be denied simply because many people suffer the same
injury .... To deny standing to persons who are in fact injured simply because
many others are also injured, would mean that the most injurious and widespread
Government actions could be questioned by nobody."
Id. at 235.
61. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.7.
62. The Act permitted the Agency to account for its expenditures "solely on the certificate
of the Director." 50 U.S.C.. § 403j(b) (2000).
63. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
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information so that he could monitor the government, "the impact on him is
plainly undifferentiated and 'common to all members of the public."'
64
The Court accordingly remitted him to the political process. 5
As these cases reveal, American courts have not adopted the concept of
the "public action," a right of any citizen to hold the government
accountable to law.66 In Schlesinger, the majority revealed its concern that
citizenship standing to contest constitutional violations would have "no
boundaries." Justice Powell's concurrence in Richardson gave a classic
exposition of judicial hesitancy to start down that road. He feared making
the judiciary a free-floating Council of Revision whose excessive power
would only invite retaliation from the political branches.67 Nevertheless,
the Flast criteria for taxpayer standing are invented ways to allow
Establishment Clause challenges to federal spending without opening the
gates to other taxpayer or citizen suits. It is possible to do something
similar for separation of powers cases.
As it has done in reapportionment cases, the Court could look for
situations where the political process will not correct a problem. In the
companion cases, both political branches profited from allegedly
unconstitutional arrangements. Secret spending protects both branches
64. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176-77 (1974). The Court quoted Ex parte
Lvitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937), a case involving the Ineligibility Clause. The Court described
Ldvitt as follows:
There Levitt sought to challenge the validity of the commission of a Supreme Court
Justice [Hugo Black] who had been nominated and confirmed as such while he was
a member of the Senate. Ldvitt alleged that the appointee had voted for an increase
in the emoluments provided by Congress for Justices of the Supreme Court during
the term for which he was last elected to the United States Senate. The claim was
that the appointment violated the explicit prohibition Art. I, §6, cl. 2, of the
Constitution .... Of course, if Levitt's allegations were true, they made out an
arguable violation of an explicit prohibition of the Constitution. Yet even this was
held insufficient to support standing because, whatever Levitt's injury, it was one
he shared with "all members of the public."
Richardson, 418 U.S. at 177-78 (internal footnote omitted).
65. In FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998), the Court subsequently upheld standing based
on an "informational injury" that is very difficult to distinguish from the injury alleged by
Richardson. In Akins, however, Congress had attempted to confer standing to challenge the
FEC's actions, as it had not done in Richardson.
66. See Louis JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 459-500 (1965)
(distinguishing public and private rights of action).
67. Justice Powell argued that "allowing unrestricted... citizen standing would
significantly alter the allocation of power at the national level, with a shift away from a
democratic form of government." Richardson, 418 U.S. at 188. Repeated confrontations
between the courts, with their limited political capital, and the political branches would harm
both sides. If courts were to employ the potent power of judicial review imprudently, "we may
witness efforts by the representative branches drastically to curb its use." Id. at 191. Justice
Stewart, who dissented in Richardson, concurred in Schlesinger. He argued that "unlike United
States v. Richardson, ... the respondents do not allege that the petitioners have refused to
perform an affirmative duty imposed upon them by the Constitution." Schlesinger v. Reservists
Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 228-29 (1974) (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Powell's
concurrence demolished this distinction between affirmative and negative constitutional duties.
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from accountability for their actions; military commissions for members of
Congress give each branch influence in the other. Obviously, discussing
political incentives of other officers to violate the Constitution is not an
activity the courts relish. Nevertheless, a responsible judgment that a
plaintiff can be left to invoke the political process does demand a corollary
judgment that the asserted constitutional violation has not vitiated that very
process.
Thus, standing could vary according to the perceived purposes of
particular constitutional provisions and how proximately they affect the
public.68 Citizen standing to enforce the Incompatibility Clause could be
grounded on three premises. First, the purpose of the Clause is to prevent
consensual arrangements by the political branches that violate its
command. Second, violations would likely skew legislative behavior in
ways that affect citizens. Third, there is likely no other available plaintiff.
For a contrary example, consider a citizen's attempt to review a decision by
Congress concerning whether to expel a member for misconduct on the
floor. If expelled, the member would provide a superior plaintiff; if not,
the interests of the public in policing this aspect of congressional behavior
seem far more remote than an incompatibility controversy. Moreover,
Congress can claim an autonomy interest in controlling its internal
processes, an interest that would not be present in other constitutional
contexts.
Standing is a doctrine that identifies parties who may sue, as compared
to other possible parties. When all citizens share the same interest in a
possible constitutional violation, as in Richardson, a denial of standing
equates to a determination that an issue is a political question. In
Schlesinger, the Court remarked that the "more sensitive and complex task
of determining whether a particular issue presents a political question"
influenced courts to prefer standing analysis.69 Perhaps this preference
deters some abuses by leaving the other branches to wonder whether the
Court might someday find a suitable plaintiff if sufficiently tempted to do
so.
These two doctrines can, however, produce different outcomes, as the
companion cases illustrate. Richardson may have presented a political
question, given the sensitive judgments that underlie secret spending and
the limited capacity of courts to review them intelligently. If some secret
spending is legitimate, courts probably lack manageable standards for
determining how much to allow. Alternatively, the cloak-and-dagger
68. Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Justice Scalia, Standing, and Public Law Litigation, 42 DUKE L.J.
1141,1162 (1993).
69. Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 215.
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aspects of national security spending fairly invite a reviewing court to
announce that the issue is textually committed to the political branches.
In contrast, the Incompatibility Clause presents no barrier to the
articulation of manageable legal standards. The opinion by Judge Gesell
that the Supreme Court reversed in Schlesinger provides an example.7°
Reaching the merits, he noted that most congressmen were in the Standby
or Retired components of the reserve. All were subject to a call to active
duty without their consent. Standby status carried no pay but allowed
participation in training and accrual of promotion and retirement credits.
Retired members could receive pay. Gesell decided that the purposes of
the Clause barred these affiliations-it meant to erect "an inflexible
barrier" against the holding of "any other office" by members of
Congress. 7' He cited a report by the House Judiciary Committee that
forbade a Representative to serve in the National Guard and that rejected an
argument for a de minimis exception to the Clause on grounds that "no line
can be drawn between the large and the small office. The Constitution
prohibits a Member of Congress from holding 'any' office under the United
States .. ,72
A bright line is certainly a manageable standard. For good measure,
Judge Gesell added an argument based on degrees of influence: "[G]iven
the enormous involvement of Congress in matters affecting the military, the
potential conflict between an office in the military and an office in
Congress is not inconsequential. 73 In addition, members of the reserves
were disproportionately represented on congressional committees that dealt
with military affairs.
I agree that the Framers would have considered "corruption" through
influence purchased by offices to be a matter not of degree but of kind-
hence the force of Justice Douglas's argument about "constitutional
fences." The mutuality of influence that stems from joint office holding
creates conflicts of interest in both federal branches, as it did in
Schlesinger. A reservist member of Congress experienced conflicting
incentives both within the military itself-solidarity with the war effort
versus fear of callup-and between military and legislator status-loyalty
to military needs versus demands of civilians. High defense officials
experienced incentives to curry favor with reservist congressmen regardless
of whether that behavior accorded with military principles. The usual
response to such conflicts is to forbid them, rather than to assess whether
they have, in fact, produced the evils feared.
70. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War v. Laird, 323 F. Supp. 833 (D.D.C. 1971).
71. Id. at 838.
72. H.R. REP. No. 64-885, at 7 (1916).
73. Laird, 323 F. Supp. at 838-39.
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The fact that the Department of Justice declined to consider the merits of
the very issue involved in Schlesinger reveals that the executive is not free
of its own debilitating conflicts in considering these issues. 74 Unless the
courts are willing to reach the merits of incompatibility controversies, the
Clause may not be enforced even when vital interests of the public are at
stake. Congress can receive some deference by judicial crafting of a de
minimis exception. Thus, Congress allows uncompensated service by its
Members as trustees of public institutions and in similar functions.7 5 Some
kinds of honorific extra-legislative service are harmless and even laudable,
but I would not allow service with any entity that has any role in
implementing federal law.
III. THE LEGISLATIVE VETO: A BOUNDARY DEFINED BY PROCESS
A longstanding constitutional controversy over the legislative veto,
which was eventually settled by the Supreme Court in a landmark case,
reveals the need to define where legislation ends and execution begins. By
drawing a bright, formal line between these two constitutional functions,
the Court has clarified their allocation between legislative and executive
officers. The Court's distinction is essential to the operation of the
incompatibility principle.
Legislative veto is a shorthand phrase for any mechanism through which
Congress employs a resolution of one or both of its houses to approve or
disapprove an executive exercise of delegated authority. 76  These
resolutions purport to have mandatory effect, although they are not
submitted to the President for his possible veto. For example, using a
"one-house veto," Congress may delegate to an agency the authority to
promulgate a rule, but provide that the rule shall not go into effect if it is
disapproved by either house of Congress. A two-house veto takes the form
of a concurrent resolution, which is a resolution of both houses not
submitted to the president.
77
The use of legislative vetoes resulted from congressional frustration with
the problem of delegating power to the executive. Congress has never been
comfortable with broad grants of statutory power because they are so
difficult to modify or retract in the face of the president's veto. The power
of the president's veto is great: Throughout American history, Congress has
74. See supra note 53.
75. Dellinger, supra note 46; CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH OFFICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S.
Doc. No. 99-16, at 131 (1987).
76. For a comprehensive history of the legislative veto, see Watson, supra note 35. There
also have been vetoes assigned to committees in either of the houses of Congress.
77. In contrast, a joint resolution is presented to the president and is essentially the same as
ordinary legislation. It creates no constitutional issues.
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overridden only about seven percent of presidential vetoes. 78 At the same
time, Congress has not wanted to confine executive discretion so closely in
advance that national needs might go unmet. To Congress, the veto device
offered a very attractive alternative to this dilemma-an initial, broad
delegation could be made, but with legislative veto authority retained.
Then Congress could monitor executive implementation of the statute and
veto particular actions that it disapproved. Between the eve of the New
Deal, when the device first became prominent, and 1983, when the
Supreme Court considered the constitutional issue, it was embedded in over
200 statutes.79
Presidents from Franklin Roosevelt through Ronald Reagan resisted
legislative veto provisions on both constitutional and policy grounds, while
often signing bills containing veto provisions. The primary constitutional
objection was always that legislative veto resolutions have the effect of law
because they invalidate otherwise effective executive actions, yet they are
not presented to the president for his veto or signature. Ironically, the veto,
designed to increase congressional control of the executive, decreased that
control whenever Congress did not give active review to an executive
action because it encouraged Congress to make broader delegations than it
would have done in the absence of the veto reservation.
80
The Supreme Court finally considered the issue in Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. Chadha.81 A provision of the Immigration and
Nationality Act authorized the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) to suspend an alien's deportation on grounds of "extreme hardship,"
and allowed either house of Congress to pass a resolution to invalidate any
suspension. Chadha, an alien who was deportable because his student visa
had expired, sought and obtained suspension of deportation from INS. At
an adjudicative hearing within INS, he proved hardship by establishing that
78. PETER M. SHANE & HAROLD H. BRUFF, SEPARATION OF POWERS LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 151-55 (2d ed. 2005) (discussing the extent of presidential veto power and
noting that by 2003, there had been a total of 2,550 such vetoes-il,484 regular and 1,066
pocket). The figure of seven percent does not include pocket vetoes, which are absolute. Id.
at 153.
79. See James Abourezk, The Congressional Veto: A Contemporary Response to Executive
Encroachment on Legislative Prerogatives, 52 IND. L. REv. 323, 324 (1977):
Since 1932, when the first veto provision was enacted into law, 295 congressional
veto-type procedures have been inserted in 196 different statutes as follows: from
1932 to 1939, five statutes were affected; from 1940-49, nineteen statutes; between
1950-59, thirty-four statutes; and from 1960-69, forty-nine. From the year 1970
through 1975, at least one hundred sixty-three such provisions were included in
eighty-nine laws.
Id.
80. Harold H. Bruff & Ernest Gellhorn, Congressional Control of Administrative
Regulation: A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1369 (1977) (characterizing the
legislative veto as a "negative check on policies proposed by the agencies, not a means for
making policy directly").
81. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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he might suffer discrimination if deported. The Chairman of the House
Subcommittee on Immigration subsequently introduced a resolution
opposing several suspensions of deportation, including Chadha's. The
House passed the resolution by voice vote after a floor statement by the
Chairman arguing that these individuals did not meet the statutory standard
for hardship.
When Chadha's challenge to the congressional veto reached the Supreme
Court, Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion began by reviewing the
purposes of the clauses in Article I of the Constitution that define the
legislative process and require presentation of bills to the President. Both
the bicameral structure of Congress and the president's veto, he said, were
designed with two goals in mind: to check congressional encroachment on
the executive by providing the President a means of self-defense, and to
promote wise legislation by filtering it through three separate constituency
bases. This much was not controversial.
The Court then stated that the bicameralism and presentment
requirements of Article I applied only to exercises of "legislative power."
The House resolution regarding Chadha was legislative because it "had the
purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of
persons, including the Attorney General, Executive Branch officials and
Chadha, all outside the Legislative Branch., 8 2  In other words, the
resolution had legal effect like a statute; therefore, it had to be processed
like a statute. Because Congress had granted statutory authority to the INS
to suspend deportations, the Court held that it "must abide by its delegation
of authority until that delegation is legislatively altered or revoked.
' 83
Accordingly, the one-house legislative veto offended both the bicameralism
and presentment requirements of Article I.
84
82. Id. at 952.
83. Id. at 955.
84. In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell observed that the Court had swept away all
other legislative veto provisions, as none of them provided for presentation to the president. He
would have invalidated the challenged statute on a narrower ground. "When Congress finds
that a particular person does not satisfy the statutory criteria for permanent residence in this
country it has assumed a judicial function in violation of the principle of separation of powers."
Id. at 960. He stressed constitutional history-the early state legislatures had assumed and
abused judicial powers, much to the distress of the Framers of the Constitution. They had
responded with the general safeguard of separated powers and, more specifically, the Bill of
Attainder Clause in Article I, § 9. Both were intended to prevent trial by legislature. Justice
Powell stated that in this case, the House clearly did not enact a general rule; rather, it
determined that certain persons did not meet specific statutory criteria. Consequently, the House
had exercised unchecked power. Its action lacked the substantive and procedural constraints that
force administrative agencies and courts to treat individuals fairly. Even the political check that
attends enactment of general rules that bind everyone was lost. Justice Powell provided a
persuasive explanation of the inappropriateness of the legislative veto in cases involving
individuals. Even so, Congress does decide many particular matters by legislation, and there is
little chance that these statutes will be held to violate the separation of powers. Moreover,
congressional review of executive action through the legislative veto virtually always
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Justice White, in a long dissent, defended the legislative veto.
[I]t has not been a sword with which Congress has struck out
to aggrandize itself at the expense of the other branches-the
concerns of Madison and Hamilton. Rather, the veto has been
a means of defense, a reservation of ultimate authority
necessary if Congress is to fulfill its designated role under
Art. I as the Nation's lawmaker.
85
He stressed the practical devolution of lawmaking power to the executive
under the broad delegations of power that created the administrative state.
This led him to see executive actions, for example in promulgating vast
numbers of regulations, as true changes in law upon which Congress
attempted to retain a modest check.
Hence, Justice White regarded an executive action such as the
suspension of Chadha's deportation as a proposed change in law, which
would then be effective only if both houses of Congress accepted it. This
met the requirements of Article I, he argued, although in reverse order.
86
This "reverse legislation" theory has an irony.87 It might justify a one-
house veto because majorities in both houses must support an executive
action for it to survive. Yet it would not support a two-house veto, which
at least satisfies the need for bicameral action. The reason for this
discrepancy is that if a proposed change in law is effective when either
house supports it, passing legislation is far easier than the Framers intended
it to be.
Justice White's "reverse legislation" theory has another fundamental
defect. Executive actions that implement statutes are not merely proposals
for legislation. They are the core of executive power in the constitutional
sense. It is the executive who is charged to "take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed."88  The Court tried to make this point in a rather
considered broad policy concerns that are distinct from the limited purposes of judicial review.
Therefore, the majority was correct to focus on Article I.
85. Id. at 974. Justice Rehnquist also dissented, arguing that Congress did not intend the
legislative veto provision to be severable from the rest of the statute (even though the statute
contained a provision favoring severability). Therefore, Chadha could not prevail because even
if he won his constitutional point, no suspension authority would remain, and he would be
deported.
86. Justice White also argued that the veto mechanism meets Article I requirements
because it is merely a condition contained in a statute that is passed in full constitutional fashion.
Certainly, statutes condition executive action on a myriad of events, but it begs the question of
the validity of the legislative veto mechanism to uphold it on the basis of the process that its
authorizing statute has undergone. Instead, the issue is the validity of the particular condition,
just as it would be for a condition containing a defect that is unrelated to congressional process.
87. See Peter M. Shane, The Separation of Powers and the Rule of Law: The Virtues of
"Seeing the Trees, " 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 375, 380-81 n.27 (1989) (further discussing the
"reverse legislation" theory).
88. U.S. CONST. art. I1, § 3.
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clumsy and conclusory footnote. 89 It correctly stated that executive actions,
except for those based on the president's independent constitutional
powers, draw their legal effect from an authorizing statute and may not
exceed its scope. Congress can decide a policy issue directly through
legislation or delegate it to the executive. To the extent it does the latter,
the delegated discretion is executive in nature until Congress removes the
authority through legislation.
The Court's decision in Chadha has received sharp criticism.90 It is easy
to fault the majority opinion for its conclusory and formalistic approach.
The Court stated a syllogism: legislation must follow the constitutional
path; legislative veto resolutions have legal effect; therefore, they are
unconstitutional. Perhaps the majority was correct in finding that Chadha
was an easy case, dictated by the plain meaning of the Constitution.9'
Many observers, however, disagree.
The Chadha Court never did connect its conclusions to the purposes of
bicameralism and presentation. By making that connection, it is possible to
articulate a more complete rationale for the Court's action. The structure of
Article I serves three purposes, of which the Court identified two-
preventing encroachments on the executive and dampening the effects of
89. The Court said:
To be sure, some administrative agency action-rulemaking, for example-may
resemble "lawmaking."... This Court has referred to agency activity as being
"quasi-legislative" in character.... When the Attorney General performs his duties
pursuant to. § 244, he does not exercise "legislative" power. The bicameral process
is not necessary as a check on the Executive's administration of the laws because
his administrative activity cannot reach beyond the limits of the statute that created
it-a statute duly enacted pursuant to Art. I, §§ 1, 7.... It is clear, therefore, that
the Attorney General acts in his presumptively Art. II capacity when he administers
the Immigration and Nationality Act. Executive action under legislatively
delegated authority that might resemble "legislative" action in some respects is not
subject to the approval of both Houses of Congress and the President for the reason
that the Constitution does not so require....
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 953-54 n.16 (1983) (citations omitted).
90. See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, INS v. Chadha: The Administrative Constitution, the
Constitution, and the Legislative Veto, 1983 Sup. CT. REV. 125, 134-35, 144-47; Peter L.
Strauss, Was There a Baby in the Bathwater? A Comment on the Supreme Court's Legislative
Veto Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 789; Laurence H. Tribe, The Legislative Veto Decision: A Law
by Any Other Name?, 21 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 5-9 (1984).
91. Peter M. Shane, Conventionalism in Constitutional Interpretation and the Place of
Administrative Agencies, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 573, 585-86 (1987).
It is difficult to see how two-house vetoes, not presented to the President, can pass
muster under [the Presentment Clauses] .... If that is true, then the question in INS
v. Chadha was essentially, is there any reason to think that one-house vetoes are
more permissible than two-house vetoes? ... No matter what purpose is ascribed to
article I, section 7, I cannot imagine an affirmative answer to that question.
Id. See Harold J. Krent, Separating the Strands in Separation of Powers Controversies, 74 VA.
L. REV. 1253 (1988) (arguing that the Constitution prescribes, in a way that is capable of
relatively formal implementation, how and when each branch may act, but leaves open to a
balancing analysis those cases where one branch acts within express constitutional constraints,
although in a manner that intrudes on another branch's domain); Geoffrey P. Miller,
Independent Agencies, 1986 SuP. CT. REV. 41, 52-58.
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faction.92 The third is to reduce the amount of legislation that would
burden the people. The legislative veto interferes with the realization of all
three.
When Congress sent the President a bill containing a legislative veto
provision, it simultaneously contravened two of the purposes of Article I.
First, it proposed an encroachment on executive power. In both theory and
practice, legislative veto provisions gave Congress a share in the execution
of the law in a way that infringed on the incompatibility principle. Without
legislative veto authority, the executive bears sole legal responsibility for
statutory implementation. With a veto, one or both houses share that
responsibility through their power to choose whether to override executive
action or to allow it. In practice, programs containing veto provisions
featured much more direct participation by congressional committees in
formulating executive actions than is otherwise the case. 93 The committees
possessed this increased leverage because it was relatively easy to pass a
veto resolution compared to ordinary legislation. This leverage was not
based on the fact that the other house and the president were not needed,
but occurred because a veto resolution did not call for an affirmative and
perhaps controversial statement of policy by the house passing it. The veto
resolution could simply reject the particular executive policy in question,
and could be justified by the institutional congressional need to keep the
executive under control.
If legislative vetoes encroached on executive power, why did presidents
sign so many statutes containing them? The reason is that the executive
wanted power that Congress would not delegate without a veto condition.
Hence, statutes containing vetoes expanded the power of the federal
government as compared to ordinary legislation. Presidents yielded to the
temptation to enter into improper bargains with Congress, receiving
increased executive power but sharing it with Congress. This pattern
evaded the attempt of the Framers to make the legislative process
cumbersome enough to minimize federal legislation, leaving the states and
the people free to govern themselves.
The Court could also have pointed out that the Incompatibility Clause
forbids Congress from engaging in execution. To the framing generation,
the spectacle of Congress and the president bargaining to expand their joint
power by trading on mutual influence and evading the limits of the
Presentation Clauses would have seemed like "corruption" at its worst.
Moreover, the Framers-in-government debated the permissible limits of
congressional delegation of power to the executive in quite modern terms,
92. See Harold H. Bruff, Legislative Formality, Administrative Rationality, 63 TEX. L. REv.
207,220-22 (1984).
93. See Bruff& Gellhom, supra note 80, at 1378-81.
2007]
ADMINISTRATIVE LA W REVIEW
revealing their shared view that the boundary between the legislature and
executive required enforcement.94
Supporters of the legislative veto can rejoice, however, as Justice
Holmes once pithily remarked: "The duty of the President to see that the
laws be executed is a duty that does not go beyond the laws or require him
to achieve more than Congress sees fit to leave within his power., 95 It is
certainly true that the president is entitled to no particular substantive
content in the statutes empowering the executive, at least outside the realm
of his independent constitutional powers over foreign policy and war-
making. At the same time, not every procedural condition on delegation is
96automatically valid, as the Holmes position suggests. 6 The presence in our
Constitution of both the Presentation Clause and the Incompatibility Clause
requires us to find some boundary between legislation and execution. That
boundary is necessarily one of process.
Agencies perform functions that resemble all three constitutional
archetypes of power: they adjudicate cases as do the courts, promulgate
rules as does Congress, and take enforcement action as does the
executive. 97  Hence, there is no coherent functional definition of the
boundary between legislation and execution. The one available boundary
is that of statutory process: While a statute delegating power to the
executive exists, that power is executive in the constitutional sense, until
and unless modified or revoked. This boundary recognizes only contingent
executive authority, but in light of the practical power of the president's
opportunity to veto rescinding legislation, that authority is substantial. The
process boundary also reflects the conventional understanding of the limits
of congressional and executive oversight of agency action: Informal
political pressure may influence an agency within the limits of authority
conferred by statute, but may not induce a contravention of that authority. 98
After Chadha, Congress has continued to include legislative veto
provisions in new legislation, especially appropriations statutes. Although
the executive claims that these have no legal effect, Congress clearly
expects informal compliance with them and often obtains it.99  This
94. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS, THE FEDERALIST PERIOD 1789-
1801 147-49, 246-47 (1997).
95. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 177 (1926) (Holmes, J., dissenting); accord id.
at 292 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("The President performs his full constitutional duty, if,
with the means and instruments provided by Congress and within the limitations prescribed
by it, he uses his best endeavors to secure the faithful execution of the laws enacted.").
96. Thus, the quote from Holmes' dissenting opinion in Myers, id. at 177, was offered
in support of a statute requiring the Senate's advice and consent to remove an executive
officer, a condition that the Supreme Court did not allow Congress to impose.
97. See generally RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., 1 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, ch. 2
(2002).
98. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
99. Louis FISHER, CONGRESSIONAL ABDICATION ON WAR AND SPENDING 180-81 (2000);
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phenomenon reveals a fundamental difference between substantive
legislation and appropriations, one that reveals why enforcement of the
process boundary for substantive statutes is important. Most appropriations
require yearly renewal if they are to continue.100 This primal fact brings the
executive to Congress to seek funds just as the presence of the president's
veto brings Congress to the White House when it wishes to legislate. In the
yearly appropriations cycle, the executive often wishes to "reprogram"
funds from one budgeted purpose to another within a statutory
appropriations account.101  To do so, it consults the appropriations
committees within Congress, lest retaliatory budget-slashing occur the next
year. Adding a legislative veto provision to this tradition provides
emphasis but little more. In other words, for yearly appropriations, the
presence or absence of a legislative veto has little legal or practical
consequence.
To maintain the reciprocal binding effect of the president's veto for
substantive legislation and Congress's power of the purse for
appropriations on the branches, each branch needs autonomy within its
sphere. The president needs the unimpaired bulwark of his veto
opportunity for substantive legislation as much as Congress needs its power
to deny funding by the simple expedient of doing nothing.
IV. THE LINE ITEM VETO: A MISNOMER
Proposals granting the President a statutory line item veto circulated for
many years before Congress initiated such an experiment in 1996. The
impetus behind these proposals was that the president, with his national
constituency, was not subject to the incentives that caused members of
Congress to package spending provisions favorable to localities into
omnibus, "pork barrel" legislation. The Line Item Veto Act authorized the
President to "cancel" three types of provisions in enacted appropriations
statutes: "(1) any dollar amount of discretionary budget authority; (2) any
item of new direct spending; or (3) any limited tax benefit. °10 2  A
cancellation would be effective if not overturned by enactment of a special
disapproval bill by both Houses, subject to presidential veto.
Louis Fisher, The Legislative Veto: Invalidated, It Survives, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 273,
288-91 (1993).
100. See generally ALLEN SCHICK WITH FELIX LOSTRACCO, THE FEDERAL BUDGET:
POLITICS, POLICY, PROCESS (rev. ed. 2000).
101. Since the executive's budgetary promises about the use of funds within a statutory
appropriations account appear in the legislative history and not the statute, they lack direct
legal effect. Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182 (1993).
102. 2 U.S.C. § 691(a) (2000).
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In Clinton v. City of New York, 10 3 the Supreme Court invalidated the Act.
The President had cancelled two spending provisions; in response, the
Court held that "[i]n both legal and practical effect, the President has
amended two Acts of Congress by repealing a portion of each.' 0 4 Under
Chadha, repeal of statutes, like enactment, had to follow the full dictates of
Article I. Hence, the Act was unconstitutional. Justice Stevens' majority
opinion struggled to distinguish traditional statutory delegations of
authority to the President. For example, he said that Field v. Clark,'°5 in
which the Court upheld presidential power to suspend exemptions from
import duties, was a case involving the execution of a congressional policy,
rather than a presidential action rejecting a congressional policy. That
distinction, however, omits attention to the statutory policy contained in the
Line Item Veto Act. Furthermore, the majority would not compare the Act
to the president's traditional authority to withhold some spending authorized
by appropriations statutes. The difference was that "this Act gives the
President the unilateral power to change the text of duly enacted statutes."'
0 6
Clinton is thus a formalist opinion much in the style of Chadha. This
time, though, the Court was wrong. The two former professors of
administrative law on the Court, Justices Scalia and Breyer, who were
joined by Justice O'Connor, furnished the correct analysis. They
characterized the Act as making a delegation to the executive that was
subject to the usual need for legislative standards, which were present.
Justice Scalia remarked that the title of the Line Item Veto Act "has
succeeded in faking out the Supreme Court."' 0 7 In both Chadha and
Clinton, the statutory authorizations for legislative or item vetoes had been
enacted through the full constitutional process for legislation. The
difference lay in the identity of the recipient of the delegated power. In
Chadha, power flowed to one or both houses of Congress to control the
implementation of executive power in violation of the incompatibility
principle. In Clinton, power flowed to the president to make policy choices
within the range of discretion conferred by statute, in compliance with the
incompatibility principle. This distinction also accords with traditional
practice under the Constitution. Appropriating funds is clearly a function
103. 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
104. Id. at 438.
105. 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
106. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 447.
107. Id. at 469.
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solely for Congress; 108 spending those funds is an executive function that is
controlled by the appropriations statutes but ordinarily contains substantial
amounts of discretion."°9
V. EXECUTIVE APPOINTMENTS AND REMOVALS
The body of Supreme Court doctrine that most often implicates the
incompatibility principle is that concerning the appointment and removal of
executive officers. The Appointments Clause of Article II works closely
with the Incompatibility Clause to separate legislation from execution. The
Supreme Court has consistently allowed Congress to restrict, but not
assume, executive powers of appointment and removal. Again, the effect is
to keep legislation and execution in separate hands.
The Constitutional Convention gave serious attention to the method of
executive appointments. The initial draft constitution by the Committee of
Detail gave the Senate power to appoint ambassadors and Supreme Court
Justices; the president could appoint other officers. 10  Late in the
Convention, the Committee of Eleven took up unfinished business and
reported back the Appointments Clause in essentially its present form.
Evidently a compromise had occurred. The Senate's proposed hegemony
of foreign policy and the judiciary was replaced by authority in the
president to nominate all officers, subject to the check of the Senate's
advice and consent for principal officers. The Convention adopted the
change. 11
It is interesting to speculate about the changes in American history that
would have resulted had the Convention adopted the initial version of the
appointments scheme. The president would have controlled an executive
branch for domestic but not foreign policy. A foreign policy dictated by
scores of masters would have been notably less coherent at any given time
than has been the case. To compensate, the overall direction of foreign
policy might have been stabilized by the absence of sharp reversals as the
presidency changed hands. The courts would have lacked the insulation
from Congress that stems from executive nomination, with some loss of
their independence. The road to the Supreme Court would have gone
through the Senate. A Supreme Court closely allied to the Senate might
have articulated a narrow view of executive power under the Constitution.
Such a Court probably would not have taken a strict view of the
Incompatibility Clause.
108. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 ("No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.").
109. See SCHICK wiTH LoSTR.Acco, supra note 100.




For many years, Congress made no effort to strip the president of his role
in executive appointments.' 1 2  In Buckley v. Valeo," 3 however, the
Supreme Court invalidated such an effort. It refused to allow Congress to
appoint members of the Federal Election Commission (FEC), which
regulates campaigns for federal elective office. Congress had required the
FEC, an independent regulatory agency, to have two Commissioners
appointed by the president, two by the House of Representatives, and two
by the Senate. Each of the three appointing authorities had to select one
person from each political party; a majority of both houses of Congress
would then vote to confirm the nominees. The Secretary of the Senate and
the Clerk of the House were also to serve as ex officio, nonvoting
members. This unique arrangement undoubtedly reflected the political
sensitivity of the FEC's duties, which are to regulate members of Congress
and presidential candidates themselves. The FEC's center of gravity would
surely have been on Capitol Hill, from which a majority of its members
were to come.
The Court decided that this scheme violated the Appointments Clause,
which does not authorize congressional appointments of executive
officers. 14 The majority did not discuss the Incompatibility Clause. Justice
White thought that the two clauses operated in tandem to establish the
"fundamental tenet ... that the same persons should not both legislate and
administer the laws."'" 5 The Court held that "any appointee exercising
significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States is an 'Officer
of the United States,' and must, therefore, be appointed in the manner
prescribed by" the Appointments Clause." I6  The Court said that
congressional appointees could perform investigative and informative tasks
of the sort that congressional committees do, but that only "Officers of the
United States" could do the FEC's duties of bringing civil enforcement
actions, promulgating regulations, and deciding administrative
adjudications.
112. In Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189 (1928), the Court
held that the Legislature of the Philippine Islands could not provide for legislative appointment
to executive agencies.
113. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
114. The Court rejected an argument that Congress's power over federal elections,
combined with the Necessary and Proper Clause, justified the scheme:
Appellee Commission... finally contend[s] ... that... Congress had ample
authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause of Art. I to effectuate this result
.... Congress could not, merely because it concluded that such a measure was
"necessary and proper" to the discharge of its substantive legislative authority, pass
a bill of attainder or ex post facto law contrary to the prohibitions contained in. § 9
of Art. I.
Id. at 134-35.
115. Id. at 272-73 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
116. Id. at 126 (majority).
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The Court's sharp distinction between investigative and administrative
tasks allows Congress to perform its vital investigative functions, whether
directly or through special entities it may create. Moreover, the test is easy
to apply. It does allow Congress to use the power of information about an
agency's activities to influence its policy-in that sense, the distinction is
not as clear in practice as it is in theory." 7  Among functions that do
constitute execution of the law, the Court included the "quasi-legislative"
activity of rulemaking and the "quasi-judicial" activity of adjudication,
rejecting an argument that these were not executive in the constitutional
sense. 1 8 This part of the opinion was consistent with Chadha's emphasis
that all exercises of delegated statutory power that have legal effect
constitute execution of the law.
Buckley was formalist in approach-the Court started with the text of the
Appointments Clause, added a premise about what officers do, and
concluded that Congress could not share this power because it was not on
the list of those who may appoint executive officers. 1 9 The Court did not
ask the questions usually associated with functional analysis: Whether core
executive functions are threatened, how much, and with what justification.
The Court could easily have written a purely functionalist opinion,
however, because the President would retain little control of administration
if Congress could place ordinary regulation in the hands of its own agents.
The opposite result in Buckley would have shifted a large portion of control
over the agencies from the executive to Congress, producing, in fact, the
"congressional government" that Woodrow Wilson described in the late
nineteenth century. Hence, the Court's choice of an analytic approach in
Buckley did not affect the outcome.
In Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for Abatement
of Aircraft Noise, Inc. (MWAA), 20 the Supreme Court overturned another
117. Regarding investigative functions, consider the United States Commission on Civil
Rights. Under 42 U.S.C.. § 1975c (2000), the Commission's duties are to "study and collect
information" and then to "make appraisals of the laws and policies of the Federal Government"
concerning civil rights violations, and to report its findings to Congress and the President.
42 U.S.C. § 1975a. Following a controversy over President Reagan's removal of several
Commission members, the Commission was reconstituted by Congress. See Comment, The
Rise and Fall of the United States Commission on Civil Rights, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 449,
476-80 (1987). Under 42 U.S.C.. § 1975(b)(1), four members are appointed by the president,
two by the President pro tempore of the Senate, and two by the Speaker of the House. See
42 U.S.C. § 1975(b)(l)-(4). Even though the Commission's activities are investigative, the
president could argue that he should be able to appoint all the members of a body that functions
as a watchdog over federal civil rights enforcement. Congress would respond by saying that is a
good reason for the current composition of the Commission.
118. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 140-41 (1976).
119. See Theodore Y. Blumoff, Illusions of Constitutional Decisionmaking: Politics and the
Tenure Powers in the Court, 73 IOWA L. REv. 1079, 1155-61 (1988) (criticizing the Supreme
Court's approach in appointments cases); Theodore Y. Blumoff, Separation of Powers and the
Origins of the Appointment Clause, 37 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1037, 1041-44 (1987) (same).
120. 501 U.S. 252 (1991).
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congressional involvement in administration through appointments. In
MWAA, Congress authorized the transfer of control over two major airports
near the District of Columbia from the Federal Aviation Administration to
the MWAA, a regional authority established by a Virginia-D.C. compact.
To assume control of the airports, the MWAA had to create a Board of
Review with the power to veto its decisions. The nine members of the
Board of Review were required to be members of Congress, "serving in
their individual capacities" as representatives of airport users. Litigation
arose over approval of a master plan for expansion of National Airport.
The Supreme Court decided that the Board of Review's power to veto
decisions of the MWAA represented federal action taken on behalf of
Congress. 12 Turning to the permissibility of the Board's composition, the
Court disclaimed direct reliance on either the Appointments Clause or the
Incompatibility Clause. Instead, Justice Stevens' majority opinion relied
on general separation of powers principles. He noted the Framers' fears of
the legislature:
To forestall the danger of encroachment "beyond the legislative sphere,"
the Constitution imposes two basic and related constraints on the
Congress. It may not "invest itself or its Members with either executive
power or judicial power." And, when it exercises its legislative power, it
must follow the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered,
procedures" specified in Article I.
•.. The Court of Appeals found it unnecessary to discuss the second
constraint because the court was satisfied that the power exercised by the
Board of Review over "key operational decisions is quintessentially
executive." We need not agree or disagree with this characterization by
the Court of Appeals to conclude that the Board of Review's power is
constitutionally impermissible. If the power is executive, the
Constitution does not permit an agent of Congress to exercise it. If the
power is legislative, Congress must exercise it in conformity with the
bicameralism and presentment requirements of Art. I, § 7.122
The majority felt no need to determine which constituted the better
characterization-the Act served as "a blueprint for extensive expansion of
the legislative power beyond its constitutionally confined role."'' 23 I think
the Board was exercising executive power by applying law generated by
Congress or the states, and MWAA could therefore have been framed as an
121. Justice White and two others dissented, arguing that it was implausible to regard Board
of Review members as agents of Congress because Congress did not appoint them, continuity in
Congress or on any committee was not a condition for completion of service on the Board,
Congress could not remove Board members, and Board members had no legal obligations to
Congress. See id. at 277-93 (White, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 274-76 (citations omitted).
123. Id. at 277.
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Incompatibility Clause case. The Court, however, held back, probably
because the Clause does not forbid members of Congress from holding
state executive offices and the conclusion that the Board performed federal
action was strained enough to counsel against further exploration of its
implications.
Congress responded to MWAA by removing the requirement that the
Board be composed of members of Congress, although it still restricted its
membership to congressional nominees. Congress also removed the
Board's veto authority, but allowed the members to have nonvoting
participation at meetings of the airport Directors. Congress further
authorized the Board to make recommendations to the Directors which, if
not adopted, would subject the Directors' actions to joint resolutions of
disapproval by Congress. In Hechinger v. Metropolitan Washington
Airports Authority,'2 4 the D.C. Circuit struck down the new arrangement.
It correctly concluded that the Board still served as an agent of Congress
and still exercised federal power as defined in MWAA.
In Federal Election Commission v. NRA Political Victory Fund,1 25 the
D.C. Circuit strictly interpreted Buckley and MWAA by finding
unconstitutional the continuing presence on the FEC of the two nonvoting
congressional appointees-a matter not discussed in Buckley. The court
held that "the mere presence of agents of Congress on an entity with
executive powers offends the Constitution"'' 26 because the congressional
agents would necessarily influence the other commissioners. As in MWAA,
the court thought that the danger of congressional encroachment on the
executive justified a strict separation of powers approach.
Two related issues in NRA Political Victory Fund concerned the
constitutionality of congressional moles within executive agencies. The
first issue dealt with whether executive officers have a substantive right to
be free of direct congressional pressure while engaging in policy
formulation. This interest in executive autonomy implicates the
incompatibility principle directly; the court correctly valued this interest
highly. The second issue, primarily procedural in nature, concerned the
confidentiality of policy dialogue. Although Congress opened many of the
deliberations of multi-member agencies like the FEC to public view
through the Sunshine Act, 127 the Act contains exceptions allowing
confidential discussions, which would lose much of their efficacy if
congressional monitors were present for discussions among the
Commissioners. A constitutional issue lurks in the background. Executive
124. 36 F.3d97 (D.C. Cir. 1994),cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1126 (1995).
125. 6 F.3d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. dismissed, 513 U.S. 88 (1994).
126. Id. at 827.
127. 5 U.S.C..§ 552b (2000).
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privilege has fallen on bad days, 128 and the Court has never decided
whether the independent agencies may avail themselves of its protection.
The basic constitutional privilege recognized in United States v. Nixon,
129
however, still shields policy debate in at least some precincts. The values
underlying both executive privilege and the incompatibility principle
suggest the need for some zone of privacy for executive deliberation.
Thus, the courts have made it clear that Congress may not administer the
laws it enacts, either directly through its own members (MWAA), or
indirectly by appointing persons who thereby become its agents (Buckley).
Nor may Congress take legislative action without presentation to the
president (Chadha). When Congress is not trying to seize the reins
controlling ordinary regulation from the executive, the Court has not taken
a strict formalist view of the Appointments Clause. Thus, the Court has
upheld the use of private arbitrators to apply statutory norms in some
federal programs. 130 Because these cases concerned adjudicative functions,
the Court's concerns centered on the requisites of Article III and due
process, not the Appointments Clause. The Court has also blessed an
executive agreement that transferred claims pending in federal court to
international arbitral panels composed partly of foreign citizens who are
emphatically not "Officers of the United States." 131 Historical practice and
the nation's needs for effective international claims settlement mechanisms
took precedence over a literal interpretation of the Appointments Clause.
Once an officer is appointed, he or she can be removed by Congress
through the impeachment power. However, everyone understands that this
power is too limited and cumbersome to serve as an everyday tool for
supervising an officer's conduct. As a result, most controversies focus on
the availability and nature of other means of removing executive officers.
The assumption throughout has been that the branch that can remove an
officer controls the officer for constitutional purposes.
The Constitutional Convention did not discuss the subject of removal,
except for the question of impeachment. The First Congress considered the
removal issue in 1789 in the process of constructing the new executive
departments. The result has been called the "decision of 1789," a name
that obscures an important ambiguity in the decision that actually
occurred.132 In the House, Madison moved for the creation of departments
128. See Symposium, Executive Privilege and the Clinton Presidency, 8 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 535 (2000).
129. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
130. See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prod. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985); Schweiker
v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188 (1982); see also Harold H. Bruff, Public Programs, Private Deciders:
The Constitutionality ofArbitration in Federal Programs, 67 TEx. L. REv. 441,446-48 (1989).
131. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686-87 (1981); Harold H. Bruff, Can
Buckley Clear Customs?, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1309 (1992).
132. See CuRaRE, supra note 94, at 36-41; MILLER, supra note 17, at 52-70, app.
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of war, treasury, and foreign affairs. Each was to be headed by a secretary,
who would be appointed by the president with the advice and consent of
the Senate and who would "be removable by the President." Madison
thought that removal was an exclusively executive power, serving the
."great principle of unity and responsibility in the Executive department."'
133
He confronted substantial opposition from two disparate groups, however.
Some Representatives thought that removal lay in the control of Congress,
to be conferred or restricted by statute. Others thought that, like
appointment, the removal of a principal officer should require the consent
of the Senate. This last group could cite The Federalist No. 77 as authority,
in which Hamilton, quite uncharacteristically, took that very position.'
34
During this controversy, Hamilton sent word to Congress that he had since
changed his mind! 1
35
Given his status as a good legislative general, Madison divided the
opposition and won a partial victory over one group and a complete victory
over the other. Through an ally, Madison crafted a substitute for his
original text. The new text identified the subordinate who would run the
Department "whenever the principal officer shall be removed" by the
President. The provision, which added the support of those who thought
Congress could confer or deny removal to those who thought it an
executive function, became law.' 36 This terminology allowed Madison to
hope that his position would eventually be vindicated, and indeed it would
be. The only position in the debate that had been definitely rejected was
the one that Congress could always participate in particular removals by
refusing to consent to them.
An unlitigated removal controversy that presented the issue of senatorial
participation in removals culminated in our first impeachment of a
President. Andrew Johnson's impeachment and near removal from office
resulted from his defiance of the Tenure of Office Act of 1867, which
forbade presidential removal of cabinet members without the consent of the
Senate. 37 Johnson vetoed the bill on the grounds of its unconstitutionality,
and his veto was immediately overridden. He then removed Secretary of
133. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 499 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
134. THE FEDERALIST NO. 77, at 372 (Alexander Hamilton) (Terrence Ball ed., 2003)
("The consent of [the Senate] would be necessary to displace as well as to appoint. A
change of the chief magistrate therefore would not occasion so violent or so general a
revolution in the officers of the government, as might be expected if he were the sole
disposer of offices.").
135. See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF
THE CONSTITUTION 350 (1996).
136. The same statutory technique regarding removal of the secretary was used in forming
all three of the original departments-State, War, and Treasury. See LEONARD D. WHITE, THE
FEDERALISTS, A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY 118-31 (1948).




War Stanton, who had opposed his Reconstruction policies. The House
impeached Johnson for his act of defiance; the Senate fell one vote short of
the two-thirds majority needed for conviction and removal. The courts
never entered the fray.
Johnson's acquittal, at a time when he was extremely unpopular in
Congress for his activities during the presidential phase of Reconstruction,
has provided an important political precedent for the nation.
138
Impeachment could have become a rough form of a no-confidence vote
about a presidency, moving our system toward a parliamentary executive.
If even Andrew Johnson could escape-after he had gone far toward
squandering the fruits of military victory in the Civil War by a policy of
appeasement of the defeated South-no merely unpopular President would
have to fear impeachment.
On the merits of the action that served as the basis for the impeachment,
Johnson correctly perceived the unconstitutionality of the Tenure of Office
Act. If a president cannot remove a Secretary of War or a Secretary of
State who undermines and defies him-as Stanton had Johnson-he cannot
implement his independent constitutional powers relating to war and
foreign affairs. Nor would such a diminished president be able to discharge
his general duty to assure that the laws are faithfully executed. Both
appointments and incompatibility principles suggest that legislation and
execution would not effectively be kept in separate hands if Congress could
require the Senate's consent to the removal of members of the president's
cabinet.
Almost sixty years after Johnson's impeachment, a remaining fragment
of the Tenure of Office Act finally produced litigation that reached the
Supreme Court. Although the proceeding involved a minor official-a
postmaster-the Court gave extensive and scholarly attention to the
underlying issues. The result must have comforted the ghost of Andrew
Johnson. Myers v. United States139 involved a statute that provided for
presidential appointment of postmasters with the advice and consent of the
Senate and forbade their removal without the consent of the Senate. These
were important patronage appointments and Congress was unwilling to
leave the political benefits of distributing them to the president or his
department heads.
Woodrow Wilson appointed Frank Myers postmaster first class for
Portland, Oregon, in 1917, for a term of four years. Some irregularities in
the administration of the Portland post office led Wilson to demand
Myers's resignation in 1920. Myers refused. Wilson directed his
138. See WILLIAM H. REHNQuiST, GRAND INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC IMPEACHMENTS OF
JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON (1992).
139. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
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Postmaster General to remove him, but decided not to present the matter to
the Senate. When Myers sued for his lost salary, the Supreme Court ruled
against him on the grounds that Congress could not condition removals on
the consent of the Senate. Chief Justice Taft, the only former President
ever to serve on the Supreme Court, wrote the majority opinion in Myers.
To Taft, the "decision of 1789" constituted a clear endorsement of the
president's unrestricted constitutional power to remove executive officers.
The actual historical record, of course, was far cloudier. Buttressed, he
thought, by constitutional history, Taft proceeded to state a broad theory of
executive power. His approach was quite formalist: No branch should
have implied power to participate in functions assigned by the Constitution
to another branch. Because removal is an executive function, the Senate
may not share it. Therefore, the president has an illimitable power to
remove those executive officers whom he has appointed.
Taft considered removal to be an executive power because the president
needs it to perform his own constitutional duties, for which he must have
loyal subordinates. 40 Surely there is a core of truth to this, but Taft did not
explain why the president needs an unlimited removal power that extends
to the Portland postmaster. It appears that Taft's underlying concern
involved the possibility that allowing Congress to block particular removals
would destroy the autonomy of the executive branch. He repeatedly quoted
Madison's statements in 1789 to the effect that Congress may define, but
not fill, executive offices. 141 The incompatibility principle strengthens that
140. Taft argued that the Senate's check on appointments is a much lesser intrusion on
executive power than a check on removals would be. "The rejection of a nominee of the
President for a particular office does not greatly embarrass him in the conscientious discharge of
his high duties... because the President usually has an ample field from which to select for
office, according to his preference, competent and capable men." Id. at 121.
141. Taft rejoined to the argument that Congress could invoke the necessary and proper
clause to participate in removals.
Another argument urged against the constitutional power of the President alone to
remove executive officers... is that, in the absence of an express power of removal
granted to the President, power to make provision for removal of all such officers is
vested in the Congress by section 8 of Article I.
Mr. Madison, mistakenly thinking that an argument like this was advanced by
Roger Sherman, took it up and answered it as follows:
He seems to think ... that the power of displacing from office is subject to
Legislative discretion; because, having a right to create, it may limit or modify
as it thinks proper.... [W]hen I consider that the Constitution clearly intended
to maintain a marked distinction between the Legislative, Executive and
Judicial powers of Government; and when I consider that if the Legislature has
a power, such as is contended for, they may subject and transfer at discretion
powers from one department of our Government to another; they may, on that
principle, exclude the President altogether from exercising any authority in the
removal of officers; they may... vest it in the whole Congress; or they may
reserve it to be exercised by this house. When I consider the consequences of
this doctrine, and compare them with the true principles of the Constitution, I
own that I can not subscribe to it....
Id. at 125-26 (citation omitted). Again, he cited Madison, "If there is any point in which the
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position, discouraging any implication that the Senate may decide whether
to allow the President to dismiss particular officers. The Tenure of Office
Act and the fate of Andrew Johnson demonstrate the danger that Congress
may attempt to capture the allegiance of executive officers from the
president. Restrictions on the power of the president to remove officers
without cause, however, present a distinct problem because the president
retains the removal power, albeit within limits.
Three dissenting Justices took an approach resembling a modem
functional one. Stressing Congress's undisputed power to define the
powers of offices and determine appropriations for them, the dissenters
argued that Congress should be able to organize the executive largely as it
pleases, under the grant of power in the "necessary and proper" clause.
142
They also argued convincingly that the president did not need plenary
removal power extending to the Portland post office to discharge his
responsibilities.
Myers, like many broad decisions, would not long survive unscathed. In
Humphrey's Executor v. United States,143 the Court limited the scope of the
president's plenary power of removal to "purely executive" officers, and
held that Congress could constitutionally forbid the president from
removing members of the Federal Trade Commission without cause. Of
course, Humphrey's Executor is best known for its sweeping dicta asserting
a special constitutional status for the independent regulatory agencies,
whose officers, the Court said, were to be independent of the president
"except in [their] selection.",144 This is not the place to rehash the endless
debate over the independent agencies. Suffice it to say that the
distinguishing structural characteristics of these agencies do not offend the
incompatibility principle. Statutes do not place execution in the hands of
Congress or its agents when they blur political partisanship by forming
multi-headed agencies that are politically balanced and protected by cause
requirements for removal.
separation of the Legislative and Executive powers ought to be maintained with great caution, it
is that which relates to officers and offices." Id. at 116 (citation omitted). And again:
As Mr. Madison said in the First Congress:
The powers relative to offices are partly Legislative and partly Executive. The
Legislature creates the office, defines the powers, limits its duration and
annexes a compensation. This done, the Legislative power ceases. They ought
to have nothing to do with designating the man to fill the office. That I
conceive to be of an Executive nature ....
Id. at 128 (citation omitted).
142. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
143. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
144. Id. at 625.
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In more recent times, the Supreme Court has considered whether
Congress may vest executive functions in an officer who is removable only
by congressional joint resolution. Bowsher v. Synar145 was a challenge to a
very complex statute, the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control
Act of 1985, popularly known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act.
146
The Act attempted to eliminate federal budget deficits by setting declining
yearly targets for them, and by creating an elaborate enforcement
mechanism. Each year, the Directors of the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) were to
independently estimate the amount of the deficit for the next fiscal year and
report their conclusions to the Comptroller General. After considering
these figures, the Comptroller was to arrive at a final estimate. If the
projected deficit exceeded the target, the president was then required to
issue an order reducing spending in many federal programs according to a
statutory formula.
This cumbersome enforcement mechanism reflected separation of
powers tensions and directly implicated the incompatibility principle.
Congress would not trust estimates by the president's agency, OMB, yet it
could not use its own appointees in CBO to execute the law. Hence, it
delegated the final decision to the Comptroller, an officer of the United
States nominated by the president and subject to senatorial confirmation.
Unlike other federal officers, however, the Comptroller is not removable by
the president, but by joint resolution for stated causes of the usual sort.14 7
Because it takes the equivalent of a statute to remove the Comptroller, the
decision to do so lies with Congress, subject to the president's veto. It was
this obscure feature of the scheme that sparked a successful challenge by
Representative Synar and others.
Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the Court concluded that the Act
unconstitutionally vested executive functions in the Comptroller. The
Court emphasized that the Constitution authorizes Congress to remove
executive officers only by impeachment. A direct congressional role in the
removal of officers charged with the execution of the laws beyond this
limited one is inconsistent with separation of powers. 48 This case, stated
the Court, resembled Myers, not Humphrey's Executor, because the latter
concerned the power of Congress to limit the president's powers of
145. 478 U.S. 714 (1986). See generally Symposium, Bowsher v. Synar, 72 CORNELL L.
REV. 421 (1987); David P. Currie, The Distribution of Powers After Bowsher, 1986 SuP. CT.
REV. 19; Jonathan L. Entin, The Removal Power and the Federal Deficit: Form, Substance, and
Administrative Independence, 75 Ky. L.J. 699 (1987).
146. 2 U.S.C.. §§ 901-907d (2000).
147. A Comptroller General may be removed by joint resolution for "(i) permanent
disability; (ii) inefficiency; (iii) neglect of duty; (iv) malfeasance; or (v) a felony or conduct
involving moral turpitude." 31 U.S.C.. § 703(e)(1) (2000).
148. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 723.
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removal. Therefore, the Court determined that it could invalidate this
statute without casting doubt on the constitutionality of ordinary
independent agencies. 1
49
Without relying explicitly on the Incompatibility Clause, the Court
invoked its values. "To permit the execution of the laws to be vested in an
officer answerable only to Congress would, in practical terms, reserve in
Congress control over the execution of the laws. 1 50  Because Congress
could not execute laws, it could not grant its own officer that power. The
Court cited the history of this removal provision to support its conclusion
that Congress meant to control the Comptroller.' 51  The Court also
analogized to Chadha, reasoning that allowing officers controlled by
Congress to execute the law would be the equivalent of a forbidden
legislative veto because Congress could threaten to remove an officer who
ignored its wishes. Finally, it was clear to the Court that the statute
assigned the Comptroller executive powers. "Interpreting a law enacted by
Congress to implement the legislative mandate is the very essence of
'execution' of the law."' 152 The Court concluded that the Act violated "the
command of the Constitution that the Congress play no direct role in the
execution of the laws."'
153
Justice Stevens wrote an odd concurrence. First, he agreed with the
majority that the Comptroller was an agent of Congress, but was so because
of the sum of his assigned statutory duties and not because of the
"dormant" removal power-no one had ever tried to remove a Comptroller.
There was much to this point-the very reason that Congress selected the
Comptroller to make final deficit estimates was that this officer is mostly,
although not entirely, an agent of Congress. For other agencies, however,
an approach that questions whether an officer's "center of gravity" is in
Congress or in the executive would not yield clear answers compared to the
149. See id. at 725 n.4.
150. Id. at 726. The Court quoted the District Court's opinion. "Once an officer is appointed,
it is only the authority that can remove him, and not the authority that appointed him, that he
must fear and, in the performance of his functions, obey." Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp.
1374, 1401 (D.D.C. 1986).
151. The removal provision came from the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, ch. 18,
§ 303, 42 Stat. 20, 23-24. An earlier version of the bill allowed removal only by concurrent
resolution of the two houses of Congress. After President Wilson objected that this would be
unconstitutional, it was changed to the present form. See H.R. Doc. No. 805-66, at 1 (1920).
The Court said that "Congress created the office because it believed that it 'needed an officer,
responsible to it alone, to check upon the application of public funds in accordance with
appropriations."' Bowsher, 478 at 730-31 (quoting HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, THE COMPTROLLER
GENERAL: A STUDY IN THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATION 65 (1939)).
152. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 733. The Court also correctly determined that "the Comptroller
General must exercise judgment concerning facts that affect the application of the Act. He must
also interpret the provisions of the Act to determine precisely what budgetary calculations are
required. Decisions of that kind are typically made by officers charged with executing a statute."
Id.
153. Id. at 736.
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majority's formalism. Where, for example, does the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System lie?
Second, Justice Stevens could not agree that the Comptroller's functions
under the Act were executive, or that characterizing them was even
essential. This was the most innovative part of his opinion. He pointed out
that Congress could have made estimates itself, in which case the power
would have been legislative. Yet, when the Comptroller did the same
thing, the majority characterized it as executive. Although he could see no
clear line between legislative and executive functions, this line exists. As
Chadha establishes, it is a matter of process-not, as Justice Stevens
assumed, of the nature of the decision involved. Until and unless Congress
assigns a policy determination to the executive, it is legislative in nature.
Once Congress enacts a statute delegating the determination to the
executive, it becomes executive power until withdrawn or modified by
another statute. The Comptroller's actions under the Act were executive
for constitutional purposes. Justice Stevens concluded that "when
Congress, or a component or an agent of Congress, seeks to make policy
that will bind the Nation, it must follow the procedures mandated by
Article I of the Constitution." 154 Not quite. When Congress makes binding
policy, that is legislation, and indeed it must follow Article I. When a
congressional agent acts pursuant to a statutory delegation, that is execution
and is forbidden by the Incompatibility Clause.
Justice White, dissenting, agreed that congressional agents may not
execute the law. He, however, could not agree that the Comptroller was
such an agent. Instead, he saw the Comptroller as independent of both
political branches, in part because removal would be so difficult to
effectuate. 155 He thought that the Comptroller would have far more reason
to fear Congress's ordinary powers of legislation and appropriation than the
presence of removal authority. 1
56
Moving on to general separation of powers analysis, Justice White,
taking a loose, functional approach, perceived no congressional usurpation
or disruption of executive prerogatives. Like Holmes and Brandeis in
Myers, he thought that the executive was entitled to the tools conferred on
154. Id. at 737.
155. Majorities in both houses would be required if the Comptroller had displeased the
president also; if not, two-thirds majorities would be needed. Id. at 771-72.
156. See id. at 774-75. Justice Blackmun, also dissenting, would have invalidated the
removal provision, if ever exercised, rather than the Deficit Control Act. Id. at 775 n.14. In the
wake of Bowsher, doubts surrounded the GAO's other statutory functions. See, e.g., Comment,
The New Separation of Powers Jurisprudence and the Comptroller General: Does He "Execute
the Law" Under the Federal Employees' Retirement Act?, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 35 (1986).
Congress could amend the removal provision to make the Comptroller removable by the
President for cause. See Paul R. Verkuil, The Status of Independent Agencies After Bowsher
v. Synar, 1986 DUKE L. J. 779, 802-04.
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it by Congress, and no more. Conflating spending with appropriation,
Justice White greatly understated the amount of executive spending
discretion that normally exists, and that may have a constitutional basis.
Whether to appropriate money ordinarily lies in the absolute discretion of
Congress; whether to spend appropriated funds is an executive decision,
within limits conferred by the appropriation. The Act, by allowing the
Comptroller to dictate spending cuts to the president for large areas of the
federal budget, may have invaded executive authority.157 The majority did
not reach the issue, and Justice White dismissed it too quickly.
In an opinion issued the same day as Bowsher, the Court described the
decision as based on congressional aggrandizement. 158  Although the
Bowsher majority phrased its opinion formalistically and made no such
assertion, that position represents an accurate characterization of the statute
it invalidated. Use of a congressional agent to perform vital executive
functions was enough both to constitute an aggrandizement and to
contravene the incompatibility principle. The Bowsher majority could have
avoided the constitutional issue of the removal provision by construing the
statute to allow the president to remove a Comptroller for reasons related to
the president's performance of his own constitutional duties. That
approach would have brought the majority to the thicket Justice Stevens
entered: the question of finding the Comptroller's center of gravity. Justice
Stevens, however, did resolve that issue correctly in Bowsher. A majority
opinion based on this rationale would have been more persuasive than the
majority's blank formalism and would have drawn a line between
executive and legislative agencies that would not have imperiled most
agencies.
Since Bowsher, the Court has followed a functional approach in two
important cases. Neither result contravenes the incompatibility principle.
In Morrison v. Olson, 59 the Court upheld the use of independent counsel to
investigate and prosecute crimes committed by senior executive officers.
The counsel were court-appointed, and could be removed by the Attorney
General for cause. The appointment portion of this scheme complied with
the Constitution's authorization of courts to appoint inferior officers. It
was also consistent with the incompatibility principle, since Congress was
not allowed to appoint the counsel. Regarding removal restrictions, the
157. See E. Donald Elliott, Regulating the Deficit After Bowsher v. Synar, 4 YALE J. ON REG.
317(1987).
158. In Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, Justice O'Connor stated: "Unlike
Bowsher, this case raises no question of the aggrandizement of congressional power at the
expense of a coordinate branch. Instead, the separation of powers question presented in this
litigation is whether Congress impermissibly undermined, without appreciable expansion of its
own power, the role of the Judicial Branch." 478 U.S. 833, 856-57 (1986).
159. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
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Court reformulated the constitutional test: Henceforth, they are invalid
only if they "impede the President's ability to perform his constitutional
duty. '"6 Indeed, that has always been the pertinent question, whatever the
verbal formulation. The Court decided that the executive branch retained
sufficient powers over independent counsel to justify the counsels'
performance of prosecutorial duties, which were clearly executive in
nature. The Court found comfort in the fact that "Congress retained for
itself no powers of control or supervision over an independent counsel.' 16'
This statutory scheme, which deeply intruded on executive autonomy,
could be justified only by the well-established need to control executive
misbehavior and by the conflicts of interest that attend self-investigation.
62
As the controversy over the investigation of President Clinton
demonstrates, however, the Act created a prosecutorial scheme remarkably
free of control by any of the constitutional branches, a concern pertinent to
functional analysis.'
63
In Mistretta v. United States,164 the Court upheld the composition of the
United States Sentencing Commission, which regulates the imposition of
criminal sentences by lower federal courts. The Court found that the
unique structure of the Commission, which combines federal judges
serving extrajudicially with executive officers, did not disturb the overall
balance of powers. It noted that although the Incompatibility Clause would
forbid policymaking by a combination of congressional and executive
officers, judges were not forbidden to perform executive functions when
not sitting on the bench, and many had done SO.
16 5
VI. THE EFFECTS OF THE INCOMPATIBILITY PRINCIPLE
In its appointment and removal cases, the Court has strictly enforced the
incompatibility principle that Congress and the executive must employ
separate personnel. Although the Court has always invoked other
provisions of the Constitution in explaining these rulings, prohibiting
160. Id. at 691.
161. Id. at 694.
162. See Harold H. Bruff, Independent Counsel and the Constitution, 24 WtLLAMETrE L.
REv. 539, 539-43 (1988).
163. See Eleanor D. Kinney, The Independent Counsel Statute, 51 ADMfN. L. REv. 627
(1999); Christopher H. Schroeder, The Independent Counsel Statute: Reform or Repeal?, 62
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1999); Jerome J. Shestack, The Independent Counsel Act: From
Watergate to Whitewater and Beyond, 86 GEO. L. J. 2011 (1998).
164. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
165. In earlier cases, two circuit courts split regarding the propriety of President
Reagan's Appointment of Circuit Judge Irving Kaufman as chair of the President's
Commission on Organized Crime. See In re Scaduto, 763 F.2d 1191 (11th Cir. 1985)
(determining that service on the Commission involved a pro-government stance that ill-
fitted judicial neutrality and that might generate information that would also undermine
neutrality); In re Scarfo, 783 F.2d 370 (3d Cir. 1986) (noting that recusal in particular cases
could protect the work of the courts).
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incompatibility provides both a common thread and a link to a firm purpose
of the Framers. Congress may not control executive officers by assuming
the president's power to nominate or remove them (Buckley, Myers,
Bowsher). Congress may, however, constrain presidential removal in ways
compatible with his duty to ensure faithful execution of the law
(Humphrey's Executor, Morrison). The Court has been strict in drawing
the line between legislative and executive functions. Congress may not
participate in execution by overriding executive actions with nonstatutory
processes (Chadha, MWAA). Yet, Congress remains free to employ
innovative structural arrangements that do not draw its Members into
execution (Mistretta). Thus, the Court has largely contented itself with
preventing our government from evolving into a parliamentary model at the
instance of Congress.
Overall, the constitutional law that governs separation of powers remains
unconfining. Many of the largest issues remain unresolved. For example,
what is the set of executive functions that Congress may shield from
plenary presidential supervision? For purposes of maintaining a system of
separated powers, it is enough to know that the president retains his
constitutional claim to exert enough supervision to ensure that he can
perform his constitutional duties (Morrison). What this may mean in a
particular context awaits assessment in the light of the facts of a particular
controversy.
In the shadow of persisting uncertainty about these ultimate issues, the
branches negotiate problems of everyday power. The dominance of a
bargaining relationship between Congress and the executive has allowed
our government to operate effectively through the years. The two most
likely determinants of the balance of power over a given issue, the
president's veto power and Congress's power of the purse, lie at the heart
of our system but outside judicial supervision. These two great stabilizers
work to prevent power struggles between the branches from spinning out of
control: The president's possession of the veto forces Congress to deal
with him if it wants to legislate. Congress's possession of the power of the
purse forces the president to deal with it if he wants the means to execute.
Thus, our system is one of bargaining under the strong practical constraint
that flows from mutual dependency.
If Congress had been allowed to blur the line between the branches, the
Madisonian competition of loyalties and values would have weakened or
evaporated as well. An "executive" officer appointed by Congress,
removable by Congress, and whose decisions are subject to legislative veto,
would be unlikely to display significant loyalty to the executive or
meaningful resistance to informal congressional pressure. Perhaps the kind
of legislative dominance that marked the revolutionary state governments
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would have evolved. Even if that failed to occur, our system could be
fundamentally different from its present form.
The political branches often make informal compensations for even the
clearest legal rules, which can undermine the law as it appears on the
books. Examples include the propensity of Congress to continue enacting
forbidden legislative vetoes-expecting informal executive compliance
with them-and the practice of the executive to clear judicial nominations
in advance with the Senate.' 66 Nevertheless, a legal rule matters even when
custom vitiates it. Some of the Court's most important decisions that
enforce the incompatibility principle tend to protect the beneficiaries of
legal rules against themselves. That is, the executive holds nomination and
removal authority and cannot formally cede them to Congress, nor may the
executive accord a legislative veto formal effect. Constitutional
responsibility for all of these matters clearly remains with the executive,
wherever practical power may place choice for the time being. The Court's
rules stand as reminders to the other two branches, and to the people as
well, about where particular constitutional duties lie.
The incompatibility principle suggests corollaries for doctrines other
than the ones that most obviously define the boundary between the
legislature and executive. First, if the executive is to remain fully
independent of Congress, impeachment must be restrained enough that it
does not evolve into a rough vote of no confidence for politically unpopular
presidents. 67 Although it is a bit early to pronounce history's verdict on
the Clinton impeachment, one careful observer believes that its effect will
be to make it more, not less, difficult to impeach future presidents for
behavior that does not obviously rise to high crimes and misdemeanors.'
68
Second, any revival of the statute that creates independent counsels to
prosecute high-level executive branch crimes must ensure better controls
on the counsels than those found in the version upheld in Morrison.
Independent prosecution, as the Clinton case shows, serves as a weapon of
sufficient force to jeopardize the independence of the executive. Third,
doctrines of executive immunity from damages should be structured to
channel partisanship into politics not litigation. Nixon v. Fitzgerald,
169
granting presidents immunity from damages for their official actions, has
166. To the founding generation, the modem practice of executive-congressional
negotiations over appointments might well have seemed the sort of mutual influence that
they condemned as "corruption."
167. Chief Justice Rehnquist's book about impeachments, supra note 138, makes this
point forcefully. See generally RICHARD POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE: THE INVESTIGATION,
IMPEACHMENT, AND TRIAL OF PRESIDENT CLINTON (1999).
168. See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS: A
CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 194 (2d ed. 2000).
169. 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
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that effect, but Clinton v. Jones,170 by exposing presidents to lawsuits for
conduct unrelated to their duties, makes it all too easy for the president's
enemies to manufacture harassing litigation. Fourth, executive privilege
disputes between the executive and Congress should be left largely to
political adjustment, as they are now.' 71 The executive privilege cases
involving judicial subpoenas have become routine losses for the
executive. 1 72 Enforcement of judicially determined showings of need for
information is a limited invasion of executive autonomy; judicial sanction
for free-ranging congressional desires for information might not be subject
to effective constraint.
CONCLUSION
In short, good fences make good neighbors. If the Court reserves its
formalist rigor for situations that fit the incompatibility principle, it will
have done almost enough by way of constitutional definition of the
essential separations of power. The possibility of aggrandizement beyond
these situations remains, however. The Court can remain alert to such
dangers, reviewing statutes with appropriate deference, as it so often does
today.
170. 520 U.S. 681 (1997).
171. Louis FISHER, THE POLITICS OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE 1 (2004).
172. See lain R. McPhie, Executive Privilege and the Clinton Presidency, 8 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 535 (2000); Randall K. Miller, Presidential Sanctuaries after the
Clinton Sex Scandals, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 647 (1999); Jonathan Turley, Paradise
Lost: The Clinton Administration and the Erosion of Executive Privilege, 60 MD. L. REV.
205 (2001).
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